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MAPPING THE CIVIL JUSTICE GAP
IN FEDERAL COURT
Roger Michalski* & Andrew Hammond**

Unrepresented litigants make up a sizable and
normatively important chunk of civil litigation in the federal
courts. Despite their importance, we still know little about
who these pro se litigants are. Debates about pro se litigation
take place without sufficient empirical information. To help
fill some of the gaps in our understanding of pro se litigants,
this Article takes a new approach by mapping where pro se
litigants live.
Using a massive dataset of 2.5 million federal dockets
from a ten-year period, we obtained addresses of nonprisoner
pro se litigants. We then geolocated these addresses and
cross-referenced that information with demographic and
economic census data. This approach does not tell us
anything about pro se litigants directly, but it allows us to
describe where pro se litigants live and identify the
communities they inhabit. While this method has limitations,
it avoids many drawbacks of other methods.
We stress two main findings. First, most pro se litigants
are profoundly ordinary. Typically, they do not hail from
demographic or economic outliers. For example, most pro se
litigants do not live in either the wealthiest or the poorest
neighborhoods. Instead, their neighborhoods represent the
middle class, with a few outliers that match the distribution
of the population. Our findings present pro se litigants as a
radically democratic element in federal courts. Pro se
litigants, perhaps more than any other type of litigant, force
federal courts into contact with a surprisingly representative
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sample of the general public. Second, there are two notable
exceptions to this representativeness. Even after accounting
for population and income, pro se litigants are more likely to
reside in communities that are not homogeneously white.
And numerous rural communities feature fewer pro se
litigants than expected.
These findings deepen and
complicate conventional narratives about pro se litigation
and provide new impetus for doctrinal and policy debates
about how the federal courts and Congress can and should
respond to self-represented litigants.
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INTRODUCTION
Unrepresented litigants make up a sizable and normatively
important chunk of civil litigation in the federal courts that merit
further study. In recent years, more than a quarter of nonprisoner
civil cases filed in federal district courts were filed pro se.1 Yet we
1. Authors’ calculation based on Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
data. See U.S. CTS., TABLE C-13: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL PRO SE AND NONPRO SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT. 30,
2021, at 1 (2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/

W06_MICHALSKIUPDATED

2022]

(DO NOT DELETE)

MAPPING THE FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE GAP

1/6/22 7:56 PM

465

know precious little about who these pro se litigants are. Meanwhile,
judges, lawyers, and academics debate what should be done about
unrepresented litigants, despite this dearth of data.2 This Article
sheds some light on these litigants by documenting where they live.
All too often, legal scholarship about courts proceeds in
nonphysical abstraction, as if courts, litigants, and lawsuits do not
have a corporeal manifestation in space that is relevant and
revealing. Instead, legal scholarship typically treats the words of
court opinions and the motions of litigants as disembodied voices on
an abstract, ethereal plane. The first contribution of this Article is to
provide a theoretical counterpoint to this dominant approach. We
take the theoretical insights of critical cartography and apply them to
the study of courts.3 This approach makes explicit the political and
economic dimensions of space, representations of space, or the lack of
such representations. The “critical” aspect of critical cartography, as
in critical race theory, is a reminder to interrogate the submerged
social and structural features of law and society that create and

jb_c13_0930.2021.pdf (reporting 102,605 nonprisoner pro se civil cases of 296,898
total nonprisoner civil cases); U.S. CTS., TABLE C-13: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—
CIVIL PRO SE AND NON-PRO SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH
PERIOD ENDING SEPT. 30, 2020, at 1 (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/data_tables/jb_c13_0930.2020.pdf (reporting 217,672 nonprisoner
pro se civil cases of 414,386 total nonprisoner civil cases); U.S. CTS., TABLE C-13:
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL PRO SE AND NON-PRO SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT,
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT. 30, 2019, at 1 (2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c13_0930.2019.pdf
(reporting 25,846 nonprisoner pro se civil cases of 242,859 total nonprisoner civil
cases); U.S. CTS., TABLE C-13: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL PRO SE AND NON-PRO
SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT. 30, 2018, at
1 (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c13_0930.
2018.pdf (reporting 26,148 nonprisoner pro se civil cases of 228,802 total
nonprisoner civil cases); U.S. CTS., TABLE C-13: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL PRO
SE AND NON-PRO SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING
SEPT. 30, 2017, at 1 (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/jb_c13_0930.2017.pdf (reporting 25,333 nonprisoner pro se civil
cases of 210,084 total nonprisoner civil cases).
2. See generally Michael Correll, Finding the Limits of Equitable Liberality:
Reconsidering the Liberal Construction of Pro Se Appellate Briefs, 35 VT. L. REV.
863 (2011) (exploring the available assistance and waiver options for pro se
litigants); Joseph M. McLaughlin, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se
Litigant’s Right to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment
Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1109 (1987) (discussing the pro se litigant’s right to
access the court); Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to
Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 1537 (2005) (arguing that proponents of greater pro se assistance
programs are “wrong”).
3. Critical cartography connects geographic knowledge with power. See
Jeremy W. Crampton & John Krygier, An Introduction to Critical Cartography,
4 ACME 11, 15 (2005).
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perpetuate inequality and inequity.4 We use critical cartography to
critique the absence of representations of power in space when
scholars, the bench, and the bar contemplate pro se litigation. We
explain and demonstrate how critical cartography can be used as a
tool to examine power in real space and illuminate the work of courts,
procedure, and litigation. We do so in the context of pro se litigation
but hope that future researchers will incorporate critical cartography
insights into their methodological repertoire in a broad range of
contexts.5 We want to investigate who federal pro se litigants are and
how their particular residence shapes their access to federal courts.
Our theoretical contribution is made possible by our access to a
massive dataset of 2.5 million federal docket sheets spanning a
decade that far surpasses previous scholarship on this topic.6 With
this dataset, we are able to make a second contribution by introducing
novel spatial methods to the study of pro se litigation. We began by
extracting addresses of nonprisoner pro se litigants from these federal
dockets. We then geolocated these addresses and intersected that
information with demographic, economic, and social data drawn from
the U.S. Census Bureau. This approach allows us to describe where
pro se litigants live and what kind of communities they inhabit. We
can see whether they and their neighbors are more likely to be poor
or rich, whether the area is urban or rural, the level of educational
attainment of residents, the racial composition of the area, and a host
of other revealing factors. To be sure, our indirect approach has
limitations, but it also has advantages over survey methods where
people might misremember, misrepresent, or simply not respond.
Theoretical insights based on critical cartography paired with
this new dataset and new methodology allow us to develop new
insights about unrepresented litigants in the federal courts. As such,
this Article makes another contribution by drawing a fresh portrait
of federal pro se litigants that dispels many dominant assumptions
and reveals new and unexpected complexities. Our empirical
analysis yields three headline findings.
First, our analysis suggests that most pro se litigants are
profoundly ordinary. Typically, they do not hail from either the
wealthiest or the poorest neighborhoods.
Instead, their
4. Traditionally, the term “critical cartography” has been used to
interrogate the “hidden agendas of cartography.” J.B. Harley, Deconstructing the
Map, CARTOGRAPHICA, Summer 1989, at 1, 3. Maps are not neutral images of
reality but rather representations of an endless series of value-laden choices. Id.
at 7.
5. Traditionally, critical cartography uses a set of discursive practices like
counter-mapping to reexamine common mapping practices. Theo Kindynis,
Ripping Up the Map: Criminology and Cartography Reconsidered, 54 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 222, 227–28 (2014). We want to utilize these insights in the context
of pro se litigation. There, interrogating and remediating the absence of spatial
representations is the critique.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 126–27.
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neighborhoods represent the middle class, with a few outliers that
match the distribution of the population.7 Similarly, pro se litigants
are located in communities whose education levels, age, and gender
earnings ratios largely mirror the rest of the general population.8
Overall, our findings present pro se litigants as a radically democratic
element in federal courts. They, perhaps more than any other type of
litigant, put federal judges, court staff, and lawyers in contact with a
surprisingly representative sample of the general public. The
communities where pro se litigants live mirror the United States as a
whole.
Second, even after accounting for population and income, pro se
litigants are more likely to reside in communities that are not
homogeneously white.9 Though often located close to federal
courthouses and in metropolitan areas with lawyers nearby, these pro
se litigants seem unable to find representation, perhaps because of a
discounting of their narratives.
This finding, then, provides
additional reasons for alarm at the failure of the legal profession and
our civil legal system to respond to the legal needs of minority
communities.
Third, numerous rural communities feature fewer pro se litigants
than expected.10 Also, while pro se plaintiffs are the norm elsewhere,
numerous rural communities have far more pro se defendants than
plaintiffs. Our data highlight often-overlooked rural communities
and their difficulties in accessing distant federal courthouses, not to
mention that legal representation is increasingly difficult to obtain in
rural America.
These three primary findings deepen and complicate the
conventional narrative on pro se litigants and provide new impetus
for doctrinal and policy debates about how courts and Congress can
respond to self-represented litigants. To ensure that federal courts
are meaningfully open to those who cannot afford or otherwise
acquire counsel, the legal profession needs to know more about who
is litigating in these courts pro se. We need to move past the
debunked commentary that there is a tidal wave of federal pro se
litigants11 and focus on learning more about who these pro se litigants
are and what neighborhoods they come from.

7. See infra Subpart IV.A.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See, e.g., Mark D. Gough & Emily S. Taylor Poppe, (Un)Changing Rates
of Pro Se Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 567, 574 (2020)
(“[T]he volume and proportion of cases involving at least one pro se party
remained stable over the observed twenty-year period. While the volume of pro
se litigation fluctuates somewhat over time, there is no evidence of a steady
increase or decrease.”).
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To do so, this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I contextualizes
our inquiry by painting the necessary backdrop: namely, the
conventional wisdom among lawyers and academics that there has
been a dramatic and problematic increase in the number and
proportion of pro se litigants in federal court over the last few decades.
With that context in mind, Part II describes our empirical strategy
and emphasizes its limitations. Part III lays out our findings with
the aid of maps of federal pro se litigants. Finally, Part IV returns to
the debates laid out at the start of the Article, this time equipped with
our findings. There, we explain how geographic insights can help
orient judges, lawyers, and academics in the ongoing debate about
how the federal courts should respond to unrepresented litigants.
I. WHAT WE (THINK WE) KNOW ABOUT PRO SE LITIGANTS IN
FEDERAL COURT
While the lion’s share of civil litigants in the United States
(including unrepresented ones) are in state court, litigants also often
act as their own advocates in federal courts.12 These pro se litigants
raise unique practical, doctrinal, and normative concerns for the legal
academy, the bar, and the federal bench. Scholars and judges debate
whether and where otherwise uniform procedures must bend to
accommodate diverse litigants.13 For example, the complexity and
nonintuitive features of, say, pleading rules, summary judgment
standards, or default judgments clash with norms of accessibility,
fairness, and participation when it comes to pro se litigants.
A.

Why Study Pro Se Litigation?

The lack of counsel in federal courts matters for a number of
reasons. First, federal courts play a unique role in our democracy.
Individuals can file claims in these courts to vindicate fundamental
rights under the Constitution and other federal law.14 Some of the
most common types of cases in federal court make that lofty rhetoric
real. Lawsuits against allegedly discriminatory employers, illegal
police conduct, and improperly processed disability claims are three
of the most common types of cases arising under federal law.15 Given
12. See, e.g., Anna E. Carpenter et al., Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 2018
WIS. L. REV. 249, 256 (2018); Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the
Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 746 (2015); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher
Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource
Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 131 (2010).
13. Ronald W. Staudt & Paula L. Hannaford, Access to Justice for the SelfRepresented Litigant: An Interdisciplinary Investigation by Designers and
Lawyers, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1017, 1019–20 (2002).
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
15. See EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2020 Enforcement and Litigation Data,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.eeoc.gov/
newsroom/eeoc-releases-fiscal-year-2020-enforcement-and-litigation-data (“The
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that special function, we should be concerned if some people cannot
vindicate their civil rights because they struggle to navigate the
country’s court system on their own.
Second and related, the United States relies heavily on private
civil litigation for the enforcement of public law.16 As a result,
ordinary people, acting as private attorneys general, help protect
others—such as consumers, workers, and shareholders—as well as
public goods, like the environment, through lawsuits.17 If the federal
courts are not accessible to these kinds of claims, the American public
law system, reliant as it is on private litigation, cannot function
properly.
Third, while state courts sometimes offer an additional forum,
state litigation is often an inadequate substitute for federal
litigation.18 Even assuming parity of federal and state litigation,
concurrent jurisdiction, with the related possibility of removal, often
means that cases that start in state court find their way to federal
court.19
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) today released
detailed breakdowns for the 67,448 charges of workplace discrimination the
agency received in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020. The agency secured $439.2 million for
victims of discrimination in the private sector and state and local government
workplaces through voluntary resolutions and litigation.”); Christina Carrega,
Millions in Lawsuit Settlements Are Another Hidden Cost of Police Misconduct,
Legal Experts Say, ABC NEWS (June 14, 2020, 10:12 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/
US/millions-lawsuit-settlements-hidden-cost-police-misconduct-legal/story?id=
70999540 (“Law enforcement liabilities made up 43.1% of lawsuits filed against
the city [of Los Angeles] during the 2018–2019 fiscal year according to the risk
management’s annual report.”); JONAH GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, A STUDY OF
SOCIAL SECURITY LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 49–50 (2016) (noting the
high number of social security denial appeals relative to the overall federal
caseload).
16. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 7–9 (2010).
17. See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Public-Private Co-Enforcement
Litigation, 104 MINN. L. REV. 811, 820 (2019); Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant
Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285, 293–99 (2016); Sean Farhang,
Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers
System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 823–28 (2008); Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing
Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515, 529–30 (2016); see also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 669, 669 (1986) (“American law relies upon private litigants to enforce
substantive provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to the
discretion of public enforcement agencies.”).
18. Cf. Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t
Solve Inequality, 148 DAEDALUS 128, 133 (2019) (arguing that state civil courts
have become the “the government branch of last resort”).
19. See Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 411, 443 (2018) (pointing out the importance of federal procedure
for state litigation due to the possibility of removal). See generally STEPHEN B.
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Fourth, since these litigants have been, and will continue to make
up, a sizable percentage of parties in federal court,20 federal district
judges and court staff will have to respond to them. The default mode
of American adversarial legalism and its concomitant conception of a
judge’s role do not line up with reality when one party does not have
the benefit of counsel or knowledge of procedural and substantive law.
We should prioritize how these unrepresented parties navigate the
federal courts because they will be litigating in these fora for decades
to come. Their presence in federal court will continue to provoke
systematic and haphazard responses from the judiciary.
To contextualize our inquiry, we recount how judges and scholars
have thought about unrepresented litigants in the federal system
over the last few decades. This review of both institutional response
and the scholarly literature typically feeds into two intertwined
narratives: first, that there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of pro se litigants and second, that courts should alter
procedures to respond to this allegedly burdensome group of litigants.
B.

“Pro se litigants are . . .”

Federal litigants have had the right to appear pro se since the
Judiciary Act of 1789.21 Yet it was not until the last half century that
judges began to publicly bemoan pro se litigants appearing in court
in large numbers.22 To be sure, this development in the history of the
federal courts is part of a broader trend in the increase in federal
litigation after World War II.23 But while there were rumblings of the
increasing prevalence of pro se litigants in the federal system,
scholars often point to the mid-1990s as a turning point. In 1995, the
Judicial Conference of the United States published its Long Range
Plan, which, among other things, attempted to address the perceived
increase in pro se litigation.24 In its Long Range Plan for the Federal
BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017) (discussing a range of
procedural changes in federal court).
20. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of
such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”)
(corresponds to the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92).
22. Andrew Hammond, The Federal Rules of Pro Se Procedure, 90 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2689, 2700–02 (2022) (discussing judicial responses to pro se litigants in
the years leading up to the Long Range Plan by analyzing articles in Judicature,
The Judges’ Journal, and the ABA Journal).
23. Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 321 (2011) (“Between 1950
and 1978, the annual filings per judge in the federal courts of appeals nearly
doubled.”).
24. See JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
63 (1995).
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Courts, the Judicial Conference declared that “a large proportion of
recent caseload increases is due to pro se filings”25 and that “[p]ro se
litigation places great stress on the resources of the federal courts.”26
In particular, “the district courts must face numerous practical
difficulties in dealing with unrepresented litigants.”27
The next year, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”), which focused on reducing the number of pro se claims
brought by prisoners in federal court.28 The PLRA sought to
fundamentally reshape prison litigation in federal court, by, among
other things, creating additional procedural barriers to lawsuits
brought by prisoners themselves.29 Proponents of the legislation
argued that the PLRA would filter out weaker claims and preserve
the meritorious claims for prison officials to resolve or allow prisoners
to vindicate statutory and constitutional claims in federal court.30
Scholars suggest that the impact of the PLRA has been to reduce the
frequency of prisoner litigation generally and consign prisoners to
sometimes faulty grievance procedures within a prison’s walls.31
Since the publication of the Long Range Plan and the enactment
of the PLRA, many who staff and study the federal courts continue to
talk of a pro se crisis in the civil legal system.32 Some emphasize
concerns that these litigants will be unable to navigate procedural

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLAN., JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., PROPOSED LONG
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 59 (1995).
28. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–134, §§ 801–10,
110 Stat. 1321, 66–77 (1996).
29. See id. §§ 801–810; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915,
1915A, 1932; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a–1997c, 1997e–1997f, 1997h; see also Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1627–32 (2003) (discussing
the PLRA’s provisions).
30. Schlanger, supra note 29, at 1633–34, 1644.
31. See Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters
Adulthood, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 153–55, 162 (2015) (discussing the impact
of the PRLA); Catherine T. Struve, The Federal Rules of Inmate Appeals, 50 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 247, 296–99 (2018). See generally KITTY CALAVITA & VALERIE JENNESS,
APPEALING TO JUSTICE: PRISONER GRIEVANCES, RIGHTS, AND CARCERAL LOGIC
(2014) (detailing the many ways the PLRA has restricted inmate access to
justice).
32. See, e.g., Candice K. Lee, Note, Access Denied: Limitations on Pro Se
Litigants’ Access to the Courts in the Eighth Circuit, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261,
1280 (2003) (noting that one judge referred to the increase as a “floodtide”); see
also Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the
Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 479 (2002)
(explaining that filings in federal courts have increased dramatically and that a
significant percentage of those filings involve pro se litigants); Staudt &
Hannaford, supra note 13, at 1018 (describing an increase in pro se filings over
the 1990s).
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rules33 and thereby clog the courts.34 Others point to research that
suggests that unrepresented litigants are less likely to win than
represented litigants, raising the concern that the right to be heard
may be undermined by the lack of counsel.35 Others worry about the
unequal bargaining power of represented litigants over their
unrepresented adversaries.36 Others still point out that judges and
lawyers associate unrepresented litigants with weaker claims.37
Meanwhile, the Judicial Conference’s official position on pro se
litigation has not changed since the publication of the Long Range
Plan over twenty-five years ago. In 2010, the Judicial Conference
adopted its Strategic Plan for the Federal Judiciary.38 In that
document and its updated version in 2015, the Judicial Conference
continued to identify pro se litigation as one of its most pressing
concerns.39
Despite this persistent conception of pro se litigants as
burdensome, the evidence that federal pro se litigation has increased
since the mid-1990s is mixed. In 2020, two researchers reviewed all
civil case filings in the federal district courts since 1999 and found no
33. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 1119 (claiming, without evidence, that
“[m]ost pro se litigants are uneducated” and this “augment[s] the futility of
expecting them to recognize complex procedural requirements without at least
notification of those requirements”); see also Correll, supra note 2, at 863
(arguing that pro se litigants constitute “a class of court-users ill-equipped to
handle many of the greatest difficulties of navigating the judicial forum”).
34. Swank, supra note 2, at 1548.
35. See D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance:
A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the
Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 903, 903–04 (2013); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of
Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court:
Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419, 419 (2001). See
generally Rebecca Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical
Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 51 (2010) (describing both anecdotal and
empirical evidence of the success of unrepresented litigants).
36. Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The Problem of
Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1582 (2002)
(explaining that the most prevalent pro se claims include landlord-tenant and
family law, where there are inherent power imbalances). The Supreme Court
acknowledged the problems when one side is represented and the other is not in
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 446–47 (2011).
37. See Kathryn M. Kroeper et al., Underestimating the Unrepresented:
Cognitive Biases Disadvantage Pro Se Litigants in Family Law Cases, 26 PSYCH.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 198, 198 (2020); Victor D. Quintanilla et al., The Signaling Effect
of Pro Se Status, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1091, 1091 (2017).
38. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 14
(2010) (identifying a goal to “[d]evelop best practices for handling claims of pro
se litigants in civil and bankruptcy cases”).
39. Id.; JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
14 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 STRATEGIC PLAN] (identifying an identical goal with
regards to pro se cases).
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evidence of a rise in pro se litigation.40 We have not seen any other
data to convince us otherwise in the district courts, but there is some
evidence that pro se litigation now is a larger share of the appellate
docket in most circuit courts.41
C.

“ . . . and therefore we must . . .”

In response to this perceived increase in pro se litigation, federal
courts and their state counterparts have responded with rule
changes, new institutions, and increased resources for unrepresented
litigants.42 In the federal system, most of that activity has occurred
not in the Supreme Court or the Judicial Conference, but in the lower
courts.
While some courts appear to be less forgiving of errors made by
pro se litigants, the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to
hold pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded, . . . to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”43 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only mention pro se litigants—and
the related in forma pauperis status—once.44 To be sure, the Judicial
Conference has addressed the issue of pro se litigants in the federal
courts repeatedly. Starting with the Long Range Plan, the federal
40. Gough & Poppe, supra note 11, at 575 (finding “little evidence of a lasting
pro se explosion measured in absolute number or proportion of filings since
1999”).
41. Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished
Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 118 MICH. L. REV. 533, 555 (2020)
(noting that “in almost every circuit pro se litigation is a greater percentage of
the courts’ workload than it was two decades ago”).
42. See, e.g., Anna E. Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, 110 GEO.
L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4–5) (on file with authors) (discussing
responses in state courts); Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se
Litigants?, JUDICATURE, July–Aug. 1998, at 13, 14–15.
43. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Hughes
v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam) (citing Haines and characterizing this
rule as “settled law”).
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(b)(6) (exempting pro se filings brought under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, or 2255 from Rule 5’s redaction requirement); FED. R. CIV.
P. 4(c)(3) (requiring courts to order a United States marshal or another officer of
the court to serve process on behalf of in forma pauperis litigants). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do mention “unrepresented” parties in Rules 4, 11, 16,
and 26, but only to include them in rules applying equally to represented parties.
The Supreme Court does shape this area of federal practice, such as with its
standard that a pleading “filed pro se is to be liberally construed.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)). But see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (claiming that
“we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should
be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel”).
See generally Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE
L.J. 1478, 1499 (2019) (discussing the treatment of low-income litigants in the
judicial code and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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judiciary published a series of documents promising a comprehensive
strategy for the federal judiciary.45 All of these documents discuss
self-represented litigants.46 The 2015 Strategic Plan, the Judicial
Conference’s most recent iteration, includes the commitment to
“[e]nsure that the federal judiciary is open and accessible to those who
participate in the judicial process.”47 Yet there have been few
systematic attempts by the Judicial Conference to adapt federal
procedures to address the needs of unrepresented parties. Instead,
the Judicial Conference specifically identified the goal of
“[d]evelop[ing] best practices for handling claims of pro se litigants in
civil and bankruptcy cases” in the 2015 plan.48 Perhaps in line with
that effort, the Federal Judicial Center has published guidance on
managing nonprisoner, self-represented litigants.49
However, not all of the recent system-wide efforts seem animated
by the Judicial Conference’s stated purpose of accessibility. The same
year the Judicial Conference avowed to adopt best practices for pro se
litigants, it removed all but two of the sample forms that accompanied
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.50 These forms, which helped
lawyers and litigants fill out a complaint and other run-of-the-mill
documents, were particularly useful for those unfamiliar with federal
practice.51
45. Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/publications/long-range-plan-federal
-courts (last visited Feb. 1, 2022) (“In 2010, the Strategic Plan for the Federal
Judiciary succeeded the Long Range Plan as the strategic plan for the Judicial
Conference and its committees.
However, its recommendations and
implementation strategies include many statements of Judicial Conference
policy that, unless superseded by later Judicial Conference action, remain in
effect to this day.”).
46. See JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 24, at 63–66.
47. 2015 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 39, at 13.
48. Id. at 14.
49. See generally JEFRI WOOD, FED. JUD. CTR., PRO SE CASE MANAGEMENT
FOR NONPRISONER CIVIL LITIGATION (2016), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/
2017/Pro_Se_Case_Management_for_Nonprisoner_Civil_Litigation.pdf;
JONA
GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., AM. JUD. SOC’Y, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE
LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS (1998).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015); Kathryn Hull, For Whom the
Bell Tolls: The End of Rule 84 (and Form 18 Patent Pleading Standards),
GORDON & REES (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.ip-blitz.com/2016/01/for-whom-thebell-tolls-the-end-of-rule-84-and-form-18-patent-pleading-standards/.
51. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Forms Had a Function: Rule 84 and the
Appendix of Forms as Guardians of the Liberal Ethos in Civil Procedure, 15 NEV.
L.J. 1113, 1137 (2015); Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil
Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 9–10, 51–52 (2016)
(noting that the Administrative Office did post additional forms on its website,
but these forms are advisory and so may not suffice per Rule 84). For a list of
current forms, see Forms, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
forms?k=&c=4 (last visited Feb. 1, 2022).
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Beyond the rulemaking and guidance of the Judicial
Conference, individual courts of appeals and district courts have also
established task forces, pro se help desks, and formal partnerships
with legal aid organizations.52 Regardless of (or maybe because of)
the Judicial Conference’s position on pro se litigants, individual
circuits and district courts exhibit significant variation in procedure
and practice when it comes to self-represented litigants.53 For the
courts of appeals, some circuits have adopted procedures that treat
self-represented litigants differently, and not just in prison
litigation.54 Many circuits rely on staff attorneys to help the appellate
courts manage cases set for disposition with short or no oral
argument.55 Some research has suggested that the courts of appeals
are less likely to hear oral argument when one side proceeds pro se.56
And most circuit courts do not allow self-represented litigants to
participate in mediation.57
There is more pro se-related activity (and even greater variation)
among the federal district courts. Nearly every one of the ninety-four
district courts has some pro se-specific rule in its local rules.58
Seventy-two district courts exempt pro se litigants from various filing
requirements, in part because the federal court system relies heavily
on its own electronic filing system, Case Management/Electronic Case
Files (“CM/ECF”).59 Some district courts provide additional guidance
to judges in assessing a pro se complaint along the lines of the
Supreme Court’s aforementioned admonition in Haines v. Kerner.60
As for other pretrial matters, over a dozen district courts permit
parties to file discovery materials with the court when the case
involves a pro se party.61 In addition to these local rules, several
district courts have published procedural guides for pro se litigants
52. See, e.g., NINTH CIR. JUD. COUNCIL TASK FORCE ON SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS, FINAL REPORT 1 (2005).
53. See generally Levy, supra note 23 (discussing rule variation among five
circuits); Hammond, supra note 22, at 2704–21 (discussing rule variation among
the ninety-four district courts).
54. See McAlister, supra note 41, at 537 (noting that many pro se appeals
receive unpublished decisions rather than the higher-tiered published opinions
given to represented litigants).
55. Staff Attorney Offices Help Manage Rising Caseloads, NONPUBLICATION,
http://www.nonpublication.com/stffattys.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2022); see also
Levy, supra note 23, at 323 (discussing this practice); McAlister, supra note 41,
at 548 (same).
56. Levy, supra note 23, at 334.
57. See JUDITH A. MCKENNA ET AL., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 179 (2000).
58. Hammond, supra note 22, at 2692, 2704.
59. Id. at 2708–10.
60. Id. at 2710–11; see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
61. Hammond, supra note 22, at 2711.
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on their websites, some of which include sample forms.62 Nineteen
district courts run a pro se help desk that is either operated by court
staff or voluntary attorneys, and a dozen courts have some kind of
partnership with a legal aid office or a law school clinic.63
Moving beyond the local rules, pro se guidebooks, and help desks
in the federal district courts, three models of judicial responses to pro
se litigation deserve further emphasis. Courts have sought to respond
systematically in three ways: (1) through pro bono panels, (2) changes
to the judge’s role, and (3) the creation of specialized courts. Federal
courts have experimented with the first, made incremental steps for
the second, and ignored the third. Incidentally, some scholars have
suggested that these three models are at odds with one another, but
we need not weigh in on that debate here.64 We highlight these
models now because later in the Article we return to what our data
suggests for each.
First, and by far the most common, federal courts have responded
to pro se litigants by trying to appoint more lawyers to represent
them. Approximately forty courts manage some kind of pro bono
panel in which the court appoints lawyers to represent litigants for
free.65 These pro bono panels vary in terms of which lawyers comprise
the available pool.66 The panels also vary as to whether attorneys can

62. Id. at 28–29. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield & Jamie Heine, Life in
the Law-Thick World: Legal Resources for Ordinary Americans, in BEYOND ELITE
LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 21 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice
eds., 2016) (describing barriers to obtaining legal information for pro se litigants).
63. Hammond, supra note 22, at 2716–18.
64. Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform),
62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1270–73 (2010) (noting that there are critics of pro se
litigation reform); Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Court
Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967,
987–90, 994 (2012) (noting that though court-initiated pro se reform is needed,
recreating the judicial system is not the answer); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing
Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the
Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
969, 970, 976 (2004) (articulating both a proposal for changing the role of the
judge in pro se cases and the drawbacks to this proposed method); Nourit
Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A
Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 473, 507 (2010) (noting
different actions taken by the courts to address pro se issues).
65. Hammond, supra note 22, at 2718; see also Clare Pastore, A Civil Right
to Counsel: Closer to Reality?, 42 LOY. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (2009) (pointing out
that, while trial judges have inherent power to appoint counsel for poor litigants,
they infrequently use it).
66. Hammond, supra note 22, at 2718–20 (identifying some district courts
that require all attorneys admitted to the court’s bar to be included in the pro
bono panel, others that require all attorneys admitted to the trial court’s bar,
others that exempt government and legal aid attorneys, and others that fill the
pool of lawyers entirely with volunteers).
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decline an appointment for any reason or essentially for good cause.67
Some district courts further limit their pro bono panels to only
assisting with certain types of cases.68 This variation should not
obscure the fact that several federal district courts are compelling
members of their local bars to address the justice gap in their
respective districts.69 In light of this significant effort across the
federal judiciary, it is worth considering whether the Judicial
Conference should build out and deepen these pro bono panels.
Second, federal courts have made incremental steps toward
relaxing the typical expectations that judges will remain wholly
impartial. These developments in federal court are part of a broader
trend in American civil litigation.70 In 2007, the American Bar
Association revised the impartiality canon of the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct by allowing judges to “make reasonable
accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have
their matters fairly heard.”71 There is little evidence that the federal
judiciary as a whole has adopted a policy or standard that guides
federal judges in how to alter their work to meet the needs of pro se
litigants or addresses whether they should do so at all. Several
district courts have rules that require that a court (or the moving
party) provide pro se litigants with additional information about the
nature and consequences of a summary judgment motion.72 This type
of rule suggests that a judge cannot simply expect an unrepresented
litigant to understand the nature and possible result of a dispositive
motion. It also raises the question of whether similar rules are not
necessary for other aspects of federal motion practice.

67. Id. at 2720 (discussing these differences).
68. Id. app. 2, at 2755–75 (documenting pro bono panels’ differences in
allowed case type).
69. See Court Programs, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/probono_public_service/policy/judicial-participation/court-programs/ (last
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
70. See Carpenter et al., supra note 42 (manuscript at 8–15) (describing in
detail the judicial role reform as a proposed solution to the problem of access to
justice in civil litigation).
71. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2, cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see
also Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 647, 664 (2017); Rebecca Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases
Involving Self-Represented Litigants, JUDGES’ J., Winter 2003, at 16, 18, 43;
Russell Engler, And Justice for All–Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting
the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2028–
31 (1999); Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the
Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 367–68
(2008); Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial
Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro
Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS, 423, 427 (2004).
72. Hammond, supra note 22, at 2711–12.
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Related to whether judges should shift from their default
passivity, federal courts have experimented with and to what extent
courts should require or relieve pro se litigants from the duty to confer
or opportunities to engage in mediation or other forms of dispute
resolution.73 Here, too, the role of a judge in encouraging and shaping
a settlement in a dispute where one side is unrepresented raises
distinct concerns, but the Federal Judicial Center suggests that
judges “encourage settlement” in pro se cases.74
Third, while Congress has created specialized courts to deal with
intellectual property,75 national security,76 and tax controversies,77
among others, it has shown little interest in creating specialized
courts to deal with pro se litigants. Of course, some district courts
funnel self-represented litigants to a specific judge in the district
court, and others relegate all pro se cases to magistrate judges.78 But
federal courts, and even state courts on the civil side, have not
embraced specialized, let alone problem-solving, courts in the ways
that state criminal courts have.79
As this Part has shown, the presence of pro se litigants in federal
courts has provoked responses from Congress, the Judicial
Conference, and most frequently, individual courts. These varied
institutional responses, though, would benefit from a stronger
empirical foundation, which we provide in the next two Parts of this
Article.
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY, DATA, AND LIMITATIONS
In this Part we explain our basic methods, data, and their
limitations. We begin by explaining the core methodological idea
73. See DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUD. CTR., ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS: AN INITIAL REPORT 7 (2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/
2012/ADR2011.pdf (identifying eighteen district courts that authorize the use of
mediation for nonprisoner pro se cases).
74. See WOOD, supra note 49, at 47–51.
75. See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit:
Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553,
555 (2010); Melissa F. Wasserman & Jonathan D. Slack, Can There Be Too Much
Specialization? Specialization in Specialized Courts, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 1405,
1408 (2021).
76. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article III, 72 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1161, 1166–67 (2015).
77. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United
States Tax Court More Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1200–01 (2008).
78. See Hammond, supra note 22, at 2707.
79. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer,
23 LAW & POL’Y 125, 128 (2001); Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for
Specialized Courts: Lessons from the VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1631–34,
1715 (2015); Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1579, 1581 (2018) (noting an example of state problem-solving
courts).
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behind this Article: to learn about pro se litigants based on where they
live. We began by using federal dockets to obtain addresses of pro se
litigants, then geotagged these addresses and census-intersected
them. This allows us to learn more about the neighborhoods of pro se
litigants, their locations, demographic composition, and a variety of
economic and social indicators.
Paired with the concept of
homophily,80 this allows us to make indirect claims about pro se
litigants. Of course, this approach entails a fundamental limitation:
none of our claims speak to the characteristics of pro se litigants
directly, only indirectly.
A.

The Challenge of Studying Pro Se Litigation

We believe there is no single way to study pro se litigation.
Instead, there are many methods that, together, help to paint an
accurate portrait of civil pro se litigation. Our focus in this Article is
on the characteristics of pro se litigants. Judges, legislators, and
academics often make assumptions about pro se litigants. Yet it is
difficult to draft rules, doctrines, court orders, and policy
recommendations without a sense of who pro se litigants are. To
inform our understanding of pro se litigants and attendant doctrinal
implications, it is essential that we learn more about pro se litigants
beyond isolated anecdotes.
But pro se litigants are difficult to study. Most of the
conventional tools deployed to study litigants are of limited
usefulness in this context. For example, researchers might be
inclined to conduct a survey of pro se litigants and ask them about,
say, their education levels, incomes, or employment statuses.
However, it might be difficult to find and reach many pro se litigants
(perhaps because they are no longer at the addresses on file with the
court). Even if found, response rates will likely be low and create a
risk of masked bias. Whatever the response rate, the survey might
be too small to allow for fine-grained distinctions (say, among pro se
litigants in different types of cases or different parts of the country).
As with all survey work, there is also the risk of faulty memory and
misrepresentations.
Even if we were to overcome those methodological challenges, it
would be difficult to precisely time our inquiry.81 Litigants may give
different answers to questions at the beginning, middle, or end of
litigation—or long after the case has concluded. Also, while it might
be easier to locate pro se parties who have active cases in court,
80. See infra notes 87–108 and accompanying text.
81. Of course, courts could collect data on civil litigant demographics. See
generally DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH (2021) (describing the
effect of race in the context of tax returns); Megan Doherty Bea & Emily S. Taylor
Poppe, Marginalized Legal Categories: Social Inequality, Family Structure, and
the Laws of Intestacy, 55 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 252 (2021) (describing how social
classifications affect different groups’ access to a treatment under the law).
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surveying them at that time raises other ethical issues, and it could
draw the ire of the opposing party or the presiding judge. We would
also be at risk of affecting litigation outcomes. For these reasons, we
decided not to conduct a survey of pro se litigants for the purposes of
this Article.82
Another potential approach is to use qualitative interviews,
which would be a wonderful tool to get rich and detailed information
that could help us explore more about motivation and specific
barriers. In the pro se context, there are places where this approach
has yielded important insights.83 However, such granularity comes
at the cost of a limited sample that would prevent claims about
national patterns.84 Given our national focus on pro se litigants
themselves, rather than judges or lawyers, qualitative interviews
would likely have yielded unacceptably low response rates,
indeterminate results, and concerns about affecting ongoing
litigation.
Instead of using surveys or qualitative interviews, this Article
implements a geographic approach.85 The core methodological idea
behind this Article is to learn about pro se litigants indirectly by
analyzing where they live. We began by using federal dockets to
obtain addresses of pro se litigants. We then geolocated these
addresses and intersected that information with Decennial Census
and American Community Survey (“ACS”) data.86 This approach
allowed us to describe where pro se litigants live and what kind of
communities
they
inhabit—for
instance,
whether
these
neighborhoods are poor or rich, urban or rural, and White or Black.
This indirect approach is built on the sociological concept of
homophily.87 Homophily refers to the observable tendency of people
82. Of course, for different purposes, survey work on pro se litigants might
be appropriate.
83. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 71, at 647 (conducting qualitative
interviews with judges on the District of Columbia administrative court to
ascertain degree and nature of active judging practices).
84. See, e.g., id. (focusing solely on the District of Columbia).
85. See Roger Michalski, MDL Immunity: Lessons from the National
Prescription Opiate Litigation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 175, 196 (2019) (“Geography is
information-rich, multifaceted, and underutilized.”).
86. Both the Decennial Census and ACS are administered by the United
States Census Bureau. See Decennial Census of Population and Housing, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census.
html (last visited Mar. 15, 2022); About the American Community Survey, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about.html (last
visited Mar. 15, 2022).
87. See generally Peter V. Marsden, Homogeneity in Confiding Relations, 10
SOC. NETWORKS 57 (1988) (examining patterns of homophilic relationships in
Americans); Miller McPherson & Lynn Smith-Lovin, Homophily in Voluntary
Organizations: Status Distance and the Composition of Face-to-Face Groups, 52
AM. SOCIO. REV. 370, 370 (1987) (finding in a study examining how group
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to associate with others who are similar to themselves in socially
significant ways.88 Put crudely: many people have neighbors and
friends that are more likely to share a host of characteristics with
them than a random individual drawn from the general population.
Few people are heterophilous (i.e., living with or near people unlike
themselves).
The concept of homophily has been used in a variety of contexts,89
but the one most relevant for our purposes is housing.90 This
tendency to self-segregate is acute in the American context, shaped,
reinforced, and often mandated by decades of de facto and de jure
segregation by race, ethnicity, and class, practices that still exist
today.91 Homophily is a way to describe “the extent to which society
composition relates to friendship that the homogeneity of a group strongly
determines its homophily).
88. See McPherson & Smith-Lovin, supra note 87, at 370 (describing
homophily as the way in which similar people connect at a higher rate than
dissimilar people).
89. See, e.g., Herminia Ibarra, Homophily and Differential Returns: Sex
Differences in Network Structure and Access in an Advertising Firm, 37 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 422, 422 (1992) (examining homophily in the context of the way in which
men and women occupy different organizational positions in the workplace);
Miller McPherson et al., Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27
ANN. REV. SOCIO. 415, 416 (2001) (examining homophily in the context of types
and dimensions of relationships); Ray Reagans & Ezra W. Zuckerman, Networks,
Diversity, and Productivity: The Social Capital of Corporate R&D Teams, 12 ORG.
SCI. 502, 502 (2001) (examining homophily in the context of diversity and
effectiveness of corporate research and development teams).
90. Housing is also a good proxy for the type of neighborhoods where most
people spend their time. See generally Qi Wang et al., Urban Mobility and
Neighborhood Isolation in America’s 50 Largest Cities, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCIS U.S. 7735, 7735 (2018) (“Residents of primarily black and Hispanic
neighborhoods—whether poor or not—are far less exposed to either nonpoor or
white middle-class neighborhoods than residents of primarily white
neighborhoods. . . . The results suggest that even though residents of
disadvantaged neighborhoods travel far and wide, their relative isolation and
segregation persist.”).
91. See Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow
Effects of Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173, 176 (2019)
(“The United States has a long and complicated history of racial segregation in
housing, enforced through public policies, individual acts of discrimination, and
mob violence.” (citations omitted)); Michelle D. Layser, How Federal Tax Law
Rewards Housing Segregation, 93 IND. L.J. 915, 963–67 (2018) (explaining the
way in which changes to low-income housing tax credits can reduce racial and
economic segregation); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 967, 981 (2012) (discussing the way in which the Fair Housing
Act’s nondiscrimination provisions cannot change consumers’ preference for
living among people of their own race). See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE
COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED
AMERICA (2017) (exploring de facto and de jure segregation in America and
arguing that desegregation is a constitutional and moral obligation); Sarah

W06_MICHALSKIUPDATED

482

(DO NOT DELETE)

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

1/6/22 7:56 PM

[Vol. 57

is predisposed towards self-segregation.”92
Sociologists have
documented the extent to which people sort geographically by social
class,93 race,94 ethnicity,95 immigration history,96 sex,97 religion,98 and
political orientation.99 Humans, it seems, have a near infinite
capacity to self-segregate, even when the law does not require that
they do so.100 As a consequence, geography is informative.
Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through
Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934 (2015) (exploring
the way in which the design of cities contributes to racial and economic
segregation).
92. Nema Dean & Gwilym Pryce, Is the Housing Market Blind to Religion?
A Perceived Substitutability Approach to Homophily and Social Integration, 54
URB. STUD. 3058, 3059 (2017).
93. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Social Class and Ethnic Segregation: A
Reconsideration of Methods and Conclusions, 46 AM. SOCIO. REV. 641, 642–43
(1981).
94. See generally, e.g., William A.V. Clark, Residential Preferences and
Neighborhood Racial Segregation: A Test of the Schelling Segregation Model,
DEMOGRAPHY, Feb. 1991, at 1 (mathematically examining persistent patterns of
segregation in large American cities); Daniel Lichter et al., Together but Apart:
Do US Whites Live in Racially Diverse Cities and Neighborhoods?, 43
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 229 (2017) (examining whether White people become
integrated with their non-White neighbors).
95. See, e.g., Jessie Bakens & Gwilym Pryce, Homophily Horizons and
Ethnic Mover Flows Among Homeowners in Scotland, 34 HOUS. STUD. 925, 925
(2019) (“This article analyses mover flows in Glasgow and the role of ethnic
homophily, the tendency for movers to be drawn to areas with similar ethnicities
to their own.”).
96. See generally, e.g., David M. Cutler et al., When Are Ghettos Bad? Lessons
from Immigrant Segregation in the United States, 63 J. URB. ECON. 759 (2008)
(examining neighborhood segregation among first-generation immigrants in the
United States).
97. Where people live does not tend to be strongly affected by gender, but
where they spend time is. See Gregorio Caetano & Vikram Maheshri, Gender
Segregation Within Neighborhoods, 77 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 253, 253 (2019)
(“Using novel data from Foursquare, a popular mobile app that documents the
activity of millions of people, we document robust, highly localized gender
segregation within neighborhoods: most venues (e.g., shops, restaurants, parks,
museums) in eight major US cities are highly gender segregated, and over half
of the gender segregation across cities occurs within Census blocks.”).
98. See, e.g., Dean & Pryce, supra note 92, at 3059 (comparing “the level of
perceived homophily with respect to religion vis-à-vis the physical attributes of
neighborhoods”).
99. See, e.g., Corey Lang & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, Partisan Sorting in
the United States, 1972–2012: New Evidence from a Dynamic Analysis, 48 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 119, 119 (2015) (examining “the extent to which the change in
geographic [political] polarization is due to the migratory patterns of the
electorate”).
100. None of this is meant to suggest that everybody who lives in segregated
neighborhoods chooses to do so. More likely, many people want, or at least do
not mind, self-segregating along some dimension (e.g., education, age, aesthetic
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We utilize this well-documented insight to learn about pro se
litigants by learning about the neighborhoods they inhabit. For
example, a pro se litigant who lives in a neighborhood with high levels
of educational attainment is more likely to have such an education
herself than a pro se litigant from a neighborhood of people with
relatively lower educational attainment.101 This connection might not
be true in any given case, but likely holds true on average. Our
approach would be useless if where people live was randomly
assigned. However, this is not the case. The stronger homophily is
in neighborhood selection and assignment, the more confident we are
in our approach and the findings it yields.
Homophily is, of course, not invariable. Some neighborhoods are
more diverse, across many dimensions, than others.
Some
neighborhoods mix people with all kinds of different characteristics.
But many neighborhoods do not. They are not a random sample of
people in the Country, or State, or even that County.
Think of where you live. Likely, the people in your immediate
neighborhood are more like you than most of us are comfortable to
admit. For example, our neighbors are likely to share our education
level.102 If you are reading these words, you likely have completed a
college degree. Most people have not.103 Yet most of your neighbors,
again, likely, will also be college graduates. Similarly, property
values are not randomly distributed across the country or even
towns.104 This contributes to more geographic sorting of people along
dimensions of wealth and income.
Legal scholars who are not directly familiar with the academic
literature on homophily nevertheless likely know its many nasty
effects. Schooling and housing segregation are widespread and
insidious, in significant part due to homophily.105 If people chose
addresses using random number generators, segregated
neighborhoods and elementary schools would be unlikely. Homophily
helps to generate and perpetuate islands of concentrated poverty,
preferences, wealth) and are less inclined to segregate along other dimensions
(e.g., race or national origin). Sadly, unintended and, alas, intended nasty
consequences abound.
101. See generally Kyle Walker, Educational Attainment in America, TEX.
CHRISTIAN UNIV. CTR. FOR URB. STUD., https://personal.tcu.edu/kylewalker/maps/
education/#7.61/40.088/-75.526 (last visited Jan. 16, 2022).
102. See id.
103. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S DEP’T OF COM., BACHELOR’S DEGREE
ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 TO 2019, at 3 (2021),
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2021/acs/acsbr-009.html.
104. Kendra Bischoff, Geography of Economic Inequality, WASH. CTR. FOR
EQUITABLE GROWTH (Oct. 31, 2016), https://equitablegrowth.org/geography-ofeconomic-inequality/ (noting that neighborhoods tend to be grouped by income).
105. Ann Owens & Jennifer Candipan, Social and Spatial Inequalities of
Educational Opportunity: A Portrait of Schools Serving High- and Low-income
Neighbourhoods in US Metropolitan Areas, 56 URB. STUD. 3178, 3178–79 (2019).
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racial segregation, and a toxic slew of other harmful effects.106 Zoning
rules can create, protect, or ameliorate the effects of homophily. Some
legal interventions, like various United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development programs, are aimed at countering
homophily.107 Others exacerbate it.108
A vibrant conversation in law and other disciplines debates how
much of human sorting is voluntary self-sorting and how much of it
is done by force.109 We do not take a position on this question for the
purposes of this Article. The mere existence of homophily is enough
to ground our approach. The stronger homophily effects are, the
stronger are our findings. Homophily, while normatively troubling,
is methodologically useful.
B.

Limitations and Caveats

Of course, this approach entails a fundamental limitation: none
of our claims speak to the characteristics of pro se litigants directly,
only indirectly. This is an important limitation of this Article and
raises bias concerns.
Bias might creep in because it is possible that pro se litigants are
systematically atypical of the neighborhoods in which they live. For
example, it could be the case that the one poor person in a
neighborhood ends up being its one pro se litigant. Or, conversely,
that the odd rich person in a poor neighborhood ends up being that
neighborhood’s lone pro se litigant. We have no way to directly rule
out these possibilities. Indeed, we suspect that there are instances
where this is the case. If widespread, such atypicality could
systematically bias our results (without ways to determine the degree
or even direction of bias and thus without the possibility of
correction). We encourage readers to keep this possibility in mind
and adjust their confidence in our findings accordingly, using other
studies and data points to confirm and contest our findings.
Overall, we are not unduly worried about the potential for
widespread atypicality. To bias our findings, the atypicality would
have to be substantively significant and systematically in one
direction or another (e.g., it is always the poor residents of a rich
community that act as pro se litigants). More likely, pro se litigants
106. DIONISSI ALIPRANTIS, FED. RSRV. BANK OF CLEVELAND, RACIAL
INEQUALITY, NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS, AND MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY 2–4 (2019).
107. See George Galster, Neighbourhood Social Mix as a Goal of Housing
Policy: A Theoretical Analysis, 7 EUR. J. HOUS. POL’Y 19, 20 (2007) (analyzing
various western European housing policies aimed at countering homophily).
108. See generally Deborah N. Archer, Exile from Main Street, 55 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 788, 823–25 (2020) (describing how a “web of policing-based housing
restrictions” affects where people who had contact with the criminal justice
system can live).
109. D.Y. Yuan, Voluntary Segregation: A Study of New Chinatown, 24
PHYLON 255, 256, 260–62 (1963).
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tend to be both below average and above average. We think it is
unlikely that pro se status is significantly correlated with a person’s
position within a small neighborhood (e.g., the sole non-college-degree
holder in a well-educated neighborhood). More likely, pro se status
has something to do with a person’s position overall (e.g., she is not
intimidated by a court’s formality due to significant educational
attainment).
This view is bolstered by the fact that for most of this Article we
are using Census Block Groups and Census Blocks as our unit of
analysis. A Census Block Group has between 600 to 3,000 people in
it, and there are more than 200,000 Block Groups.110 A populated
Census Block usually has around 50 people in it,111 and there are
more than 11 million Blocks.112 In short, our unit of analysis captures
relatively small areas—neighborhoods and even slices of a particular
neighborhood. In that sense, our study benefits from the fact that the
Census Bureau tries to make these boundaries socially relevant.113
The small size of our units of analysis enhance our confidence that
they cohere, and this, in turn, makes it less likely that the pro se
litigants in these neighborhoods are systematic outliers.
Furthermore, we believe that processes that force neighborhoods
to mingle are relatively rare. For example, there are instances of
neighborhoods in transition, such as from gentrification.114 In those
periods of transition, neighborhood data is an unreliable indicator of
what kind of people live in the neighborhood. However, this would
not bias our findings because it does not necessitate directionality. It
would merely weaken the confidence we have in our findings.
Additionally, while neighborhoods in transition undoubtedly exist,
they are relatively rare.115 Most neighborhoods are frustratingly
110. Glossary, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.census.gov/
programs-surveys/geography/about/glossary.html; 2010 Census Tallies, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.census.gov/geographies/referencefiles/time-series/geo/tallies.html.
111. Authors’ conclusion based on personal observations and calculations.
112. 2010 Census Tallies, supra note 110. Some of the Blocks are empty; they
currently do not contain residents. Katy Rossiter, What Are Census Blocks?, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (July 11, 2011), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/
random-samplings/2011/07/what-are-census-blocks.html.
113. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S DEP’T OF COM., GEOGRAPHIC AREAS
REFERENCE MANUAL 11-18 (1994), https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/reference/
GARM/Ch11GARM.pdf; cf. John M. Clapp & Yazhen Wang, Defining
Neighborhood Boundaries: Are Census Tracts Obsolete?, 59 J. URB. ECON. 259,
260–61 (2006) (arguing that new empirical techniques allow for departures from
fixed census boundaries and optimally place boundaries to control for
neighborhood characteristics).
114. See JASON RICHARDSON ET AL., NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL.,
SHIFTING NEIGHBORHOODS: GENTRIFICATION AND CULTURAL DISPLACEMENT IN
AMERICAN CITIES 4 (2019), https://ncrc.org/gentrification/.
115. Id. (noting that during the study’s observation period most
neighborhoods did not undergo gentrification).
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static.116 Alas, this is cause for concern as a normative matter, but it
is again methodologically useful here.117
Similarly, state housing interventions—such as rent control,
housing vouchers, source of income ordinances, and public housing—
might mingle neighborhoods and increase the chance of atypicality.118
Again, we believe there are relatively few neighborhoods impacted by
these effects, and the effects are likely weak. For example, public
housing does not drop out of the sky. Frequently, there are fierce
political battles about where to site public housing.119
Rich
communities tend to have more resources to resist these initiatives.120
Even if public housing units were built in a rich community, the
composition of the neighborhood would likely normalize over time.121
C.

Data

To quantify our methodological insight and build a geographic
account of federal pro se litigation, we collected and combined data
from two sources: federal docket sheets and census data.
Our approach focuses on where pro se litigants live as an indirect
way to gain a better understanding of pro se litigants themselves.
Luckily for us, all litigants in federal courts must designate an
address122 that is listed on docket sheets—a kind of cover page for
each federal civil case file.123 For pro se litigants, this address is
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 101–09 and accompanying text.
118. See Tim Devaney, Obama Making Bid to Diversify Wealthy
Neighborhoods, THE HILL (June 11, 2015), https://thehill.com/regulation/244620obamas-bid-to-diversify-wealthy-neighborhoods (explaining that a main goal of
government affordable housing is to create diversity in neighborhoods).
119. CTR. FOR HOUS. POL’Y, DON’T PUT IT HERE! DOES AFFORDABLE HOUSING
CAUSE NEARBY PROPERTY VALUES TO DECLINE? 1 (2009), https://furmancenter.org/
files/media/Dont_Put_It_Here.pdf.
120. See Corianne Peyton Scally & J. Rosie Tighe, Democracy in Action?:
NIMBY as Impediment to Equitable Affordable Housing Siting, 30 HOUS. STUD.
749, 749, 758 (2015).
121. See Rachel Garshick Kleit & Nicole Bohme Carnegie, Integrated or
Isolated? The Impact of Public Housing Redevelopment on Social Network
Homophily, 33 SOC. NETWORKS 152, 152 (2011) (“The high expectations for social
network benefits of income mixing housing programs should be tempered.”).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1)(C) (“A summons must . . . state the name and
address of the plaintiff’s attorney or—if unrepresented—of the plaintiff.”); see also
Pro Se Complaint for a Civil Case, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 2016),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/complaint_for_a_civil_case.pdf
(“Provide the [address] information below for each plaintiff named in the
complaint.”).
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 79(a)(1) (“The clerk must keep a record known as the
‘civil docket’ in the form and manner prescribed by the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts with the approval of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.”); see also FED. JUD. CTR., GUIDELINES
FOR DOCKETING CLERKS: A TRAINING AND REFERENCE RESOURCE FOR FEDERAL
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typically their home address.124 Courts also encourage pro se
litigants to keep their addresses up to date.125
We harvested these addresses of pro se litigants from a
gargantuan database of federal docket sheets generously made
available by Professor Jonah Gelbach. The data was obtained
through a grant from the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund at Yale Law
School, which “funded a contract between Yale and Thomson Reuters,
owner of Westlaw, to provide direct access to the universe of federal
district court docket reports for civil cases filed beginning on January
1, 2005.”126 As such, the database covers around 2.5 million civil
actions filed over a ten-year span. It is an almost unimaginable
bounty of data far exceeding anything previously utilized to study pro
se litigation.127
The underlying data exists in XML files that we processed caseby-case. For each case, we examined whether the address field
contained a “pro se” marker.128 This yielded around 350,000
DOCKET CLERKS 2 (1979), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Dock
Clrk.pdf (“There are very few requirements imposed on the Clerk as to how
docketing should be performed. . . . Most docketing procedures are the result of
tradition or practices used in a court, proved effective, and adopted by other
courts.”).
124. We suspect that for many of them that is the only address where they
can reliably receive mail.
125. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF ALASKA, NOTICE OF CHANGE OF
ADDRESS, https://www.akd.uscourts.gov/sites/akd/files/forms/PS23.pdf (last
visited Mar. 2, 2022); see also U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF MO., PRISONER
LITIGATION HANDBOOK 5, https://www.moep.uscourts.gov/sites/moed/files/
documents/ProSePrisonerHandbook.EDMO_.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2022) (“You
must file a change of address with the court every time your address changes.
Failure to do so will prevent the court from notifying you of developments in your
case. If any mail is returned to the court without a forwarding address and you
do not notify the court of the change of address, the court may dismiss the case.”).
126. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and
Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 369, 393 (2016).
127. Before receiving access to all of this data, we originally collected pro se
litigant addresses by hand, proceeding district by district and month by month.
Despite heroic efforts by research assistants and our own tedious work, we were
only able to collect data on a handful of districts for a very limited time range.
We mention this here to underscore our gratitude to Professor Gelbach for giving
us access to such wonderful data.
128. We wanted to flag for future researchers that this approach suffers from
a blind spot. Pro se litigation is not a binary “yes” or “no” question. Most litigants
are represented or unrepresented throughout the entirety of their lawsuits.
However, some litigants might proceed without representation for only part of
their lawsuits. For example, a pro se litigant might survive the pleading phase
and hire an attorney to help with discovery. Or perhaps after a jury verdict, a
represented party decides to handle enforcement of a judgment on her own. More
ambiguous still, a formerly represented party might ask a judge for a one-week
extension on a motion to have enough time to hire a new attorney. That party
litigated pro se (i.e., appeared at a court hearing without a legal representative)
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nonprisoner pro se cases. Beyond prisoner suits, we also excluded
from our database cases involving various other subject matters:
habeas, immigration/deportation, naturalization, and bankruptcy.
We excluded these cases not because they are unimportant, but
because they are so important that they deserve focused treatment
and raise unique issues that are beyond the scope of this Article. For
example, most prisoner suits list the pro se litigant’s address as a
correctional facility, often located in a remote area.129 We think it
would be highly misleading in this context to describe the pro se
prisoner litigants as inhabiting these neighborhoods.130 Conversely,
we included cases that other researchers might want to separate: tax
suits, Internal Revenue Service third-party suits, and Social Security
Disability suits. After also excluding duplicate entries, we were left
with around 20,000 cases per year. These numbers roughly match131
the officially reported numbers,132 giving us confidence that the “pro

but does not fit neatly into the usual understanding of pro se litigation. We
suspect that most, though not all, pro se litigants are unrepresented throughout
the entirety of their lawsuit(s). But clearly, more work needs to be done on the
prevalence of partial pro se litigation.
129. See Jacob Kang-Brown & Ram Subramanian, Out of Sight: The Growth
of Jails in Rural America, VERA INST. JUST. 2 (June 2017), https://www.vera.org/
downloads/publications/out-of-sight-growth-of-jails-rural-america.pdf
(noting
that “[d]uring the past decade, the use of jails has declined sharply in urban areas
while it has grown ever-higher in rural areas”).
130. This practice has pernicious effects. For the related context of how some
states count incarcerated persons in their places of confinement rather than at
their home addresses in the redistricting process, see, for example, Dale E. Ho,
Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the Current
Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 355–56 (2011).
131. We caution against one-to-one comparisons. For example, a suit with a
pro se plaintiff and a defendant will only count as one case in the Federal Judicial
Center (“FJC”) database but will count as two separate addresses in most of our
analysis. Conversely, a pro se plaintiff that files multiple suits counts multiple
times in the FJC database but only generates one address for most of our
analysis.
132. See, e.g., U.S. CTS., TABLE C-13: CIVIL PRO SE AND NON-PRO SE FILINGS,
BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT. 30, 2014, at 1 (2014),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C13Sep14.pdf
(reporting a total of 24,274 nonprisoner pro se cases for the twelve-month period
ending September 30, 2014); U.S. CTS., TABLE C-13: CIVIL PRO SE AND NON-PRO
SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT. 30, 2013, at
1 (2013) (reporting a total of 24,708 nonprisoner pro se cases for the twelvemonth period ending September 30, 2013); U.S. CTS., TABLE C-13: CIVIL PRO SE
AND NON-PRO SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING
SEPT. 30, 2012, at 1 (2012) (26,859 cases); U.S. CTS., TABLE C-13: CIVIL PRO SE AND
NON-PRO SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT.
30, 2011, at 189 (2011) (25,795 cases); U.S. CTS., TABLE C-13: CIVIL PRO SE AND
NON-PRO SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT.
30, 2010, at 78 (2010) (24,319 cases).
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se” docket marker is of sufficient importance to judges and docket
clerks to warrant care.133
For each case, we also determined the length of litigation and the
role of the pro se litigant. Most pro se litigants act as plaintiffs but,
of course, many are also defendants and, very rarely, act in other roles
(e.g., as a third-party defendant).134 For this Article, we did not collect
data on how pro se litigants behave (e.g., whether they file more or
fewer summary judgment motions than represented parties), but we
believe this would be an inquiry worthy of significant future work.
Having collected this information from the federal docket sheets,
we geolocated the pro se litigants based on the addresses that they
used.135 Next, we census-intersected these addresses, placing pro se
litigants into common census geographies: States, Counties and
County-equivalents, Census Tracts, Block Groups, and Census
Blocks.136 For each of these geographic units, the Census Bureau
collects and publishes demographic and economic data.137 Decennial
census data is supposed to count each individual within the
geography;138 data from the ACS comes from continuous monthly
133. Differences in the number of counted pro se litigants can arise because
some pro se litigants (like non-pro se litigants) file multiple lawsuits in a given
year. This raises methodological questions that quickly implicate normative
matters. Take, for example, a pro se litigant that files fifteen separate lawsuits
against the same defendant on the same day. The court quickly consolidates and
dismisses all causes of action. Should we treat this situation as if fifteen separate
pro se litigants sued fifteen separate defendants? Or would that misleadingly
inflate the number of pro se cases that originate from a single location?
Especially in sparsely populated areas, a lone pro se litigant that actively files
cases could single-handedly skew per capita measures of pro se litigation activity.
But then again, perhaps this pro se litigant really has suffered multiple
actionable injuries that a represented party could pursue in separate actions.
Worse still, even if we read all filings in all of these cases, we would still not know
which story captures reality more closely (because of endogeneity problems). On
the whole, given the focus of our Article, we examined pro se litigants rather than
pro se litigation.
134. Of course, given our joinder rules (e.g., counterclaims), these labels must
be used with caution.
135. A few pro se litigants listed P.O. boxes as their addresses of record.
These pro se litigants could not be geolocated, and we excluded them from all
subsequent analysis.
136. See generally GEOGRAPHY DIV., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC
ENTITIES AND CONCEPTS, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/data/
developers/geoareaconcepts.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (defining and
depicting geographic entities). For a more complete description of this
methodology, see Joshua S. Sellers & Roger Michalski, Democracy on a
Shoestring, 74 VAND. L. REV. 1079, 1097 (2021).
137. See Sellers & Michalski, supra note 136, at 1097–98.
138. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; Dep’t of Com. v. U.S. House of
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 341 (1999) (describing the census as the “linchpin
of the federal statistical system . . . collecting data on the characteristics of
individuals, households, and housing units throughout the country” (quoting
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samples over a multiyear period.139 We primarily rely in this Article
on ACS data because it is more fine grained,140 and, in some ways,
more reliable, than the decennial census data. The U.S. Census
Bureau provides data at different levels of geographical scope ranging
from Blocks, to Block Groups, to Tracts, Counties, States, Divisions,
Regions, and the Nation (as well as a range of more specialized
geographic units like Congressional Districts, Public Use Microdata
Areas, and the like).141 Smaller geographic units (like Blocks) provide
for more precision, but the Census Bureau makes some variables (e.g.,
household income) unavailable at the level of high-resolution
geographies.142 As such, use of any one census unit requires tradeoffs between precision and explanatory power. To ameliorate this
dilemma, we utilize different census units for different parts of the
analysis and, wherever possible, duplicate our analysis at multiple
levels side by side.143
For each of these census units, we also calculated their distance
to the nearest federal courthouse. To do so, we first obtained a list of
addresses of all 296 federal district courthouses144 from the official
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, COUNTING PEOPLE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1 (Duane L.
Steffey & Norman M. Bradburn eds., 1994))).
139. See Decennial Census and American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Nov. 23, 2021), https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennialcensus/about/census-acs.html.
140. Until 2000, the decennial census included a short-form and long-form
version. Id. The long-form version added more questions to the basic census
questions. See id. Since 2010, the decennial census has included the “short form”
only. Id. The more fine-grained demographic and economic work of the longform version has been accomplished since 2005 by the ACS. Id. As such, the
decennial census is focused on constitutional requirements (e.g., voting
apportionment), while the ACS tends to be more useful for up-to-date, finegrained, accurate demographic and economic data. Id.
141. See GEOGRAPHY DIV., supra note 136, at 4 (depicting a hierarchy of
census geographic entities).
142. This is in part because of privacy concerns. For example, in 2010, Block
1031, Block Group 1, Census Tract 62.02 (also known as the White House)
contained five individuals that the Census identified as “Black or African
American alone.” Id. at 7–9. If the Census Bureau provided more detailed
information, it would not be difficult at this level of granularity to match
additional information with specific individuals. However, the same information
at the Census Tract level (mingled in with, say two thousand other individuals)
poses less of a privacy concern.
143. See, e.g., infra Table 2 (utilizing Census Block Groups, Tracts, and
Counties).
144. As such, we did not inquire into the distance to courts of appeals or
bankruptcy courts. Notice also that there are instances where separate federal
districts, with separate addresses, share the same building. For instance, note
the following two district court addresses:
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United States Courts website145 and geolocated them.146 We then
calculated the distance147 between the census unit geography
centroids148 and the geolocated courthouses. This provides a proxy of
how accessible federal courthouses are in different parts of the
country.
III. FINDINGS
The result of our data collection and processing is that we can
locate pro se litigants in real space. This allows us to make claims
about the neighborhoods where pro se litigants live and where they
do not live.
U.S District Court for the Western District of Arkansas
United States Courthouse and Post Office Building
500 North State Line Avenue
Texarkana, AR 71854-5961
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
United States Courthouse and Post Office
500 North State Line Avenue
Texarkana, TX 71854-5957
Court Location: Texarkana, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE W. DIST. OF ARK.,
https://www.arwd.uscourts.gov/content/texarkana (last visited Jan. 17, 2022);
Court Location: Texarkana, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF TEX.,
https://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=location/texarkana (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
145. Federal Court Finder, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/federal-courtfinder/search (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
146. Some of the district courthouses listed are rarely used for motion practice
and trials but are available for filings. We included them in our analysis, but
future researchers might want to utilize more fine-grained distinctions. See, e.g.,
Court Location: Key West, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE S. DIST. OF FLA.,
https://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/content/key-west (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (“Due
to limited staffing, regular Court hours do not apply to the Key West Office.”).
Conversely, some courthouses have no active clerk’s office. See, e.g., Court
Location:
Aberdeen,
U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF S.D.,
https://www.sdd.uscourts.gov/content/aberdeen (last visited Jan. 17, 2022)
(“There is no staffed clerk’s office in Aberdeen.”). Again, future researchers might
want to make a different selection.
147. There are different planar and spherical calculations available to
calculate distances between two points on a globe. For our Article, we used a
planer method, but utilizing another method would not alter our findings.
148. Centroids indicate the geometric center of mass of a geometry. Put
crudely, they help us to locate the center of a geographic unit. For common
polygons (e.g., squares or circles) this is “in the middle.” For some shapes the
centroid could fall outside of the boundaries of a shape (e.g., for a doughnut or
crescent shape).
We experimented with alternative ways to determine
geographic centers that would guarantee that the resulting point falls within the
parent shape, but given how the Census Bureau determines census unit shapes,
this rarely made much of a difference. Also, please keep in mind that geographic
centers and population centers might not be the same.
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We begin with a geographic description of where pro se litigants
live. The main finding in this geographic account is that pro se
litigants tend to be urban and located near federal courthouses. Next,
we turn to demographic, economic, and social descriptions of the
neighborhoods where pro se litigants live and where they do not live.
Our main findings suggest that the neighborhoods of pro se litigants
are profoundly ordinary. Typically, pro se litigants do not hail from
the fringes of the monstrously rich or desperately poor. Instead, they
are mostly middle class, with a few outliers that match the general
population of outliers. Similarly, pro se litigants tend to be located in
communities whose education levels, age, veteran status, and gender
earnings ratios largely mirror the rest of the general population. The
most notable outliers are race and proximity to federal courthouses.
Pro se litigants are more likely to reside in communities that are less
homogeneously White and less likely to reside in rural communities
far from the nearest federal courthouse. Overall, our findings present
pro se litigants as a radically democratic element in federal courts.
They, perhaps more than any other type of litigant, bring the federal
courts into contact with a surprisingly representative sample of the
general public. For good and bad, the communities inhabited by pro
se litigants significantly mirror the communities most Americans
inhabit.
A.

The Geographic Distribution of Pro Se Litigants

We begin here by mapping the distribution of pro se litigants
across the country. Each dot in Figure 1 represents the address of
one of around two hundred thousand pro se litigants who were
involved in a civil action filed between 2005 and 2014.
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FIGURE 1. LOCATIONS OF PRO SE LITIGANTS

Note: For a full-color version of Figure 1, please view the Article online.

Figure 1 maps pro se litigants. The location of pro se litigants
mirrors the location of major population centers. Pro se litigants
cluster in predictable locations. For example, it is easy to locate major
cities, like Atlanta and Phoenix, on the map, even though the map
was constructed without reliance on where population centers are
located. This suggests that many pro se litigants are located close to
federal courthouses. Barring jurisdictional issues or transfers, many
of these pro se litigants are able to litigate close to home. This
alleviates concerns that many pro se litigants might find it unduly
expensive to travel to court to partake in proceedings. The
geographical distribution of pro se litigants also suggests that many
of them do not live in lawyer deserts.149 Whatever their reasons to
proceed pro se, for many of them it is likely not from a lack of lawyers
living or working nearby.
Of course, Figure 1 only tells us so much. Pro se litigants are
located, by and large, where people are located. To examine where
there are more or fewer pro se litigants than we would expect, we
have to take a per capita measure. Figure 2 reproduces the
information contained in Figure 1. However, this time we counted
the number of pro se litigants in a given County or County149. Lisa R. Pruitt et al., Legal Deserts: A Multi-State Perspective on Rural
Access to Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 22 (2018) (noting that while 20
percent of the population lives in rural America, only 2 percent of small law
practices are in rural areas, resulting in legal deserts where the demand for legal
services exceeds available resources).
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equivalent.150 We then divided that number by the County’s
population to obtain a per capita measure. Finally, we compared this
per capita measure for each County to the national average.151
FIGURE 2. DEVIATION FROM MEDIAN PER CAPITA PRO SE LITIGATION
RATE BY COUNTY AND COUNTY-EQUIVALENTS

Notes: Browns indicate below-average per capita pro se litigation rates.
Deeper browns indicate further distance from the average. Greens indicate
above-average pro se litigation rates. Deeper greens indicate further distance
from the average. Areas at or near the national average are left transparent. For
a full-color version of Figure 2, please view the Article online.

Figure 2 reveals where there are more pro se litigants than we
would expect based on population alone, and where there are fewer
pro se litigants than expected. Locating this information in real space
and representing it on a map allows us to show geographic patterns.
Here, Figure 2 shows a broad column of Counties in the middle of the
country where there are fewer pro se litigants than expected, based
on population alone. The column rises from Big Bend National Park
at the Texas-Mexico border and stretches north through the western
parts of Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas with arms
reaching into neighboring states.152 Conversely, Figure 2 also
150. Louisiana, for example, is divided into Parishes instead of Counties.
151. See generally Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, Police Funding, 72
FLA. L. REV. 277 (2020) (also using a comparison of local per capita measures to
national averages in order to highlight regional variations).
152. This pattern is strongly reminiscent of patterns in other contexts. See,
e.g., Roger Michalski & Stephen Rushin, Federal (De)Funding of Local Police,
110 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 54, 62 fig.1 (2021) (depicting a similar geographic column
of higher per capita federal grants to local law enforcement agencies).
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highlights a stretch along the Gulf of Mexico where there are more
pro se litigants than we would expect. Similarly, parts of the West
Coast and the New York metropolitan area are overrepresented on
the federal pro se docket.
The concentration of pro se litigants in urban centers entails a
lacuna of pro se litigants from rural areas. While rural pro se litigants
exist, they are few and far between. Conceivably, it could be the case
that incidents giving rise to litigation occur less frequently in rural
communities, that they might resolve conflicts without use of courts,
or that rural lawyers are more willing and able to represent rural
constituents. All of these potential explanations strike us as unlikely.
We believe that it is more likely that the potential pro se litigants in
rural communities are more deterred from accessing courts than their
urban counterparts. The current stock of pro se litigants suggests
that rural populations are less likely to access federal courts on their
own. This suggests that a renewed focus on providing access to justice
in rural and remote areas of the country might be warranted.
Figure 2 raises the possibility that pro se activity might be
connected to ease of access to a federal courthouse. For example,
multiple federal courthouses are located a mere subway ride away in
New York City, and even more are a short train ride out toward Long
Island, north toward White Plains, or across the Hudson River in New
Jersey.153 Perhaps this ease of access lowers barriers for pro se
litigants that have to, or expect to, appear in court. To explore the
connection between distance to a federal courthouse and geography
further, we calculated distances to the closest federal courthouse.

153. See Federal Court Finder, supra note 145 (displaying nine results after
filtering by “U.S. District Courts,” “Southern District of New York,” “Eastern
District of New York,” and “District of New Jersey”).
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FIGURE 3. DISTANCE OF CENSUS BLOCK GROUPS TO THE CLOSEST
FEDERAL COURTHOUSE

Notes: Small white dots indicate the location of active federal district courts.
Block Groups in dark reds are located close to a federal district court; those
colored in reds are further away; those in yellow are furthest away. For a fullcolor version of Figure 3, please view the Article online.

Figure 3 highlights areas of the country far from federal
courthouses. Potential pro se litigants in those locations would have
to travel for multiple hours to attend court proceedings. Distant
proceedings are, of course, always a practical concern, as distance
could entail litigation costs which, in turn, might skew outcomes. In
non-pro se litigation such concerns are less pressing than in pro se
litigation because parties can hire attorneys located wherever the
proceedings take place, knowing that often there is little need for
represented parties to be physically close to court proceedings.154
Unrepresented parties, however, do not have that option.
All of the previous figures examined the location of all pro se
litigants, no matter their role in litigation. But, of course, pro se
litigants can appear in many roles, most notably as both plaintiffs and
defendants. Figure 4 examines the relationship of geography to the
role that pro se litigants play.

154. See Pruitt et al., supra note 149, at 136 n.737 (noting that lawyers must
be available for in-person court appearances).
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FIGURE 4. COUNTIES AND COUNTY-EQUIVALENTS WHERE PRO SE
DEFENDANTS OUTNUMBER PRO SE PLAINTIFFS

Notes: Counties and County-equivalents where pro se plaintiffs outnumber
pro se defendants are in gray. Yellow indicates that there are as many or more
pro se defendants than pro se plaintiffs. Deepening browns indicate an
increasingly skewed ratio. For a full-color version of Figure 4, please view the
Article online.

In most of the country, pro se plaintiffs far outnumber pro se
defendants.155 However, Figure 4 highlights areas where pro se
litigants, if they exist at all, are more commonly defendants than
plaintiffs. Figure 4 echoes Figure 2, which showed a dearth of pro se
litigants in the middle of the country. Figure 4 reveals that most of
the fewer-than-expected pro se litigants in that geographic column
are acting as defendants, not plaintiffs.
B.

The Communities Where Pro Se Litigants Live

Having described the geographic distribution of pro se litigants,
we will now turn toward demographic, economic, and social
descriptions of the communities inhabited and not inhabited by pro
se litigants. We have already seen that many of these communities
tend to be in urban areas, but here we aim to describe them further

155. See Gough & Poppe, supra note 11, at 574 (“While it is generally known
that pro se plaintiffs account for a higher percentage of pro se litigation, our
results show that cases involving pro se plaintiffs are more than ten times as
prevalent as cases with pro se defendants.”).
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and, by portraying them, also draw an indirect portrait of the pro se
litigants who hail from these communities.
Our units of analysis throughout this Part are different levels of
census geographies. They range from the fairly small Census Blocks
to the often large and sometimes populous County and Countyequivalent level.156 Our initial approach is to compare Block Groups
that contain pro se litigants to Block Groups that do not. This
provides an initial sense of why some communities might produce
more federal pro se litigants than other communities.
TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEMOGRAPHICS BY CENSUS
TRACTS (WITH AND WITHOUT ANY FEDERAL PRO SE LITIGANTS)157

Note: The descriptive statistics above are not describing the population but,
instead, provide a measure of Census Tracts (in part to inform the work of Table
2). Some Census Tracts, especially those with small populations, can be heavily
influenced by outliers.

Table 1 compares Census Tracts with any federal pro se presence
to Tracts that have no pro se litigants. With more than seventy

156. See generally GEOGRAPHY DIV., supra note 136.
157. The descriptive statistics above are not describing the population but,
instead, provide a measure of Census Tracts (in part to inform the work of Table
2). Some Census Tracts, especially those with small populations, can be heavily
influenced by outliers.
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thousand Census Tracts,158 even small differences between the two
are quickly statistically significant. As such, we are not only looking
for statistical significance but also for meaningful substantive
differentiation. For example, while there is a difference in the median
household income of Tracts with and without pro se litigants, the
difference is not very large, and it cuts against common expectations
(pro se Tracts have a higher median household income). Similarly,
the average household size in Tracts with and without pro se litigants
is nearly indistinguishable. Conversely, Census Tracts with pro se
litigants appear far more diverse than Census Tracts without pro se
litigants.
Examining one demographic or economic indicator at a time can
provide an initial and intuitive sense of how some variables might be
implicated. However, it is inherently limited. For example, Table 1
compares Tracts with pro se litigants to those without. It cannot
distinguish between Tracts that have just one pro se litigant and
those that produce many. Similarly, it cannot untangle the complex
relations between all of these variables (see the Appendix for a
graphical display of a correlation matrix). Perhaps most importantly,
it is not well-suited to examine competing explanations and the
interaction of multiple variables. For example, imagine that we
compared rich and poor neighborhoods and found that poor
neighborhoods host more pro se litigants. It would be difficult to know
whether this is due to differences in the demographic composition of
the neighborhoods, their proximity to the nearest federal courthouse,
or differences in education levels. Any differences in the number of
pro se litigants between rich and poor neighborhoods might be due to
demography, proximity, education, or a mix of all three. Accordingly,
univariate analyses that focus on the relationship between the
number of pro se litigants in a neighborhood and any one factor are
inherently limited.
C.

Multivariable Regression Models

To overcome these limitations, in this Subpart we utilize
multivariate ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regressions. These
regressions provide numerical models that can take into account the
simultaneous effects of multiple factors and produce helpful measures
of statistical reliability. In effect, the regression models allow us to
tease out, in the above example, to what extent income, demography,
proximity, or education are related to differences in the number of pro
se litigants in different neighborhoods.
Rather than providing a single regression model, we provide in
this Subpart a series of multivariable regression models. They act on
different geographic units and different sets of independent variables.
The Census Bureau makes some variables only accessible at broader
158. 2010 Census Tallies, supra note 110.
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geographic scales.159 As a result, the different models present
tradeoffs between fine-grained distinctions at the scale of small
geographic units on the one hand, and more explanatory variables
available only for larger geographic units on the other hand. We
provide all of these models here because larger geographic units are
often not able to capture the extremely nuanced distinctions between
neighborhoods. For example, within even a small County of twenty
thousand inhabitants there might be two or more radically different
neighborhoods with different propensities to host pro se litigants.
Also, we provide three different models at the level of Census
Block Groups. The first model acts on all pro se litigants, while the
second focuses only on pro se plaintiffs and the third focuses only on
pro se defendants.160 We provide these three models to examine
whether these types of pro se litigants hail from different
neighborhoods and to start the process of developing differentiated
accounts of pro se litigants in different roles.
We want to caution at the beginning that empirical work related
to pro se litigation origins lacks a developed theoretical account that
could be utilized to construct and ground a causal model. Without
such a model, any account will likely miss confounding variables,
hidden variables, and interactions among variables. In short, the
literature on this topic leaves us with few tools to build a welldeveloped causal model. But instead of accepting this as an excuse
not to try, we wanted to take steps towards developing richer
theoretical models and to instigate more sustained empirical work.
We believe that research on courts and litigation is best understood
as an iterative dialogue, a back-and-forth, between theoretical,
doctrinal, and a broad range of empirical work. We hope our account,
though inherently limited, will launch a renewed theoretical focus on
pro se litigation and prompt further methodological developments
and refinements.

159. Cf. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE SUMMARY
FILE 5-6 (2011), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2010/
technical-documentation/complete-tech-docs/summary-file/dpsf.pdf#page=21&
zoom=100,0,0.
160. As such, this leaves out pro se litigants who have been impleaded as
third-party plaintiffs or defendants. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14.
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TABLE 2. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES—ANNUAL PER CAPITA (100,000)
UNIQUE PRO SE LITIGANTS IN CENSUS GEOGRAPHY

Notes: The distance to nearest courthouse is normalized to range from zero
to one. Short litigation is operationalized as all cases that terminate within sixty
days of the original filing or notice of removal. This cutoff is used rather than a

W06_MICHALSKIUPDATED

502

(DO NOT DELETE)

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

1/6/22 7:56 PM

[Vol. 57

continuous measure of mean or median litigation length because some geographic
units have few pro se litigants, and a single idiosyncratic outlier could skew a
continuous measure and provide for a misleading indicator. A “-1” indicates that
all pro se cases from those geographic units terminated in less than sixty days;
“1” indicates that all terminated in more than sixty days. “Non-White” is defined
as all census categories that are not indicated as “White.” ***p < 0.001; **p <
0.01; *p < 0.05.

Table 2 shows that many of the variables are statistically highly
relevant, in part because of the large number of observations.
Smaller geographical units number in the tens of thousands. This,
paired with the large dataset of federal dockets over a ten-year span,
purchases significant explanatory power.
However, numerous
variables lose statistical significance as we move from Block Groups
and Tracts to Counties. This suggests that Counties are too large a
geographic unit to capture many of the nuances between
neighborhoods that are relevant in explaining where pro se litigants
are located. While there are many Counties and County-equivalents
(over three thousand) and they vary tremendously, distinctions
within Counties are sufficiently significant to warrant moving to
smaller geographic units. A County-level analysis features a higher
adjusted R² likely because there are fewer Counties with no pro se
litigants. This suggests that even though our dataset of federal
dockets is massive, perhaps for low-probability events like federal pro
se litigation, only extremely large datasets (by current standards) are
able to tease out whether a Tract’s absence of federal pro se litigants
is due to inherent features or simply the limited time range of the
dataset.
We turn now from statistical significance to substantive
significance. Here we ask not about confidence in the measurement
but the size of a relationship. For example, median earnings are
statistically significant in almost all models but are of limited
substantive significance. In Model 1, increasing median earnings by
a massive $40,000 would typically add only one federal pro se litigant
per one hundred thousand inhabitants, relatively little compared to
the baseline of seven pro se litigants. Similarly, increasing the
median age by as much as forty years does not significantly move the
needle (only adding about half a pro se litigant). In contrast, distance
to the nearest federal courthouse has a huge effect, capable of wiping
out all gains made elsewhere. As Figure 4 showed, most Census Block
Groups and Tracts are located near federal courthouses and are not
significantly affected by this variable. However, for those further
away, distance is the strongest predictor.
Also of notable substantive significance is the percentage of the
population that is identified by the Census Bureau as non-White.
Less homogeneously White neighborhoods feature significantly more
pro se litigants. Similarly, neighborhoods where people were out of
work in the last year or that received public assistance are more likely
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to litigate pro se. Conversely, the presence of high percentages of
veterans is associated with lower numbers of pro se litigants.
Education levels impact pro se numbers, but perhaps not as much as
expected. All else being equal, a Census Block Group with no college
degrees features just two fewer pro se litigants (per one hundred
thousand) than a Block Group where every single individual has a
bachelor’s degree. Similarly, gender earnings ratios between women
and men can be read as a crude but important cultural proxy. A
neighborhood where women earn half as much as men is different
than one where they earn 1.5 times as much. Yet that huge change
adds less than one pro se litigant per one hundred thousand.
Models 2 and 3 disaggregate Model 1 by the role that pro se
litigants play. Model 2 uses pro se plaintiffs as an independent
variable; Model 3 uses pro se defendants. These models help to tease
out differences between the neighborhoods of pro se litigants in
different roles, keeping in mind that generally there are fewer federal
pro se defendants than pro se plaintiffs. The first notable difference
between the two is that pro se plaintiffs seem more susceptible to
distance to the nearest federal courthouse.
Given the more
involuntary nature of being a defendant in a suit, this conforms with
our expectations. The next notable finding is that the extent to which
a neighborhood is non-White matters much more for pro se plaintiffs
than pro se defendants. Neighborhoods where more people were out
of work in the last year generated more pro se plaintiffs and only
slightly more defendants. More drastically still, reception of public
assistance is associated with more pro se plaintiffs but reduces the
number of pro se defendants (perhaps because more of them are
judgment proof). Meanwhile, other variables like veteran status, age,
and education are comparable across both categories.
The last variable in the model measures the ratio of pro se cases
that terminated quickly to cases that took longer to resolve. The
coefficients here require more interpretation. Our goal in including
this variable was to account for variation in pro se litigation behavior.
We wanted to make progress toward distinguishing pro se litigants
who briefly visit federal courts (e.g., after a mistaken removal
followed by a quick remand) and more long-term litigation. Pro se
litigants are sometimes accused of repeated, frivolous litigation
behavior,161 and this variable is a crude (and complex) proxy for that.
We find, contrary to expectations, that neighborhoods that feature
more long-term pro se litigants also produce more pro se litigants. A
similar but smaller effect is at play for pro se defendants.
Moving from Block Groups (Models 1–3) to Tracts (Model 4)
allows us to draw on a broader range of census variables, though at
161. Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 439, 442 (2009) (noting that 76.2 percent of pro se cases
failed in one jurisdiction, and 56 percent were dismissed at the preliminary
motion stage).
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the cost of fine-grained resolution.162 Most of the direction and
magnitude of the estimators in Model 4 echoes the findings of Model
1. Most notable among the new variables is the direction and
magnitude related to health insurance. Tracts where many residents
have health insurance are far less likely to harbor pro se litigants.
We suspect that this is not due to a markedly reduced risk of legal
injury. Rather, it could be indicative of a lower need to resort to courts
to pay for medical expenses. This tentative finding could have
important implications for the national debate on health insurance
coverage.163 Perhaps one of the currently undervalued benefits of
expanding health care is a reduction in the need for costly court
proceedings.
Similarly, neighborhoods where the population receives
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) benefits
(formerly known as food stamps) are less likely to produce pro se
litigants. Some might argue that a social safety net (however frayed)
reduces the urgency of resorting to courts. Others might suggest that
people who are poor enough to qualify for SNAP benefits may not
have the resources to pursue litigation, pro se or otherwise.
Meanwhile, communities with high percentages of noncitizens are
less likely to produce pro se litigants, perhaps in part because of
unfamiliarity with the American legal system, fear of deportation, or
distrust of government institutions, generally.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
There are various implications that can be drawn from our
Article. What follows is an attempt to connect the data to some major
themes, recognizing full well that readers may draw others. First, we
consider what this data suggests about the persistent belief among
many in the federal judiciary, bar, and legal academy that pro se
litigation is a problem—one characterized by too many litigants with
few resources and few, if any, meritorious claims.164 Then, we use our
data to reflect on how reform proposals should shift to meet the needs
of communities of color and rural communities. Finally, we offer some
preliminary thoughts on how civil procedure scholars could build a
unified field theory at a time when the United States is both riven
and racked with inequality.

162. A typical Tract contains about three or four Block Groups. See
GEOGRAPHY DIV., supra note 136.
163. See generally Matthew Fiedler & Christen Linke Young, Current Debates
in Health Care Policy: A Brief Overview, BROOKINGS (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/current-debates-in-health-carepolicy-a-brief-overview/ (discussing the debates centered around health
insurance coverage and cost).
164. See Landsman, supra note 161, at 442 (explaining that most pro se claims
in one location were dismissed at the preliminary motion stage).
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A. The “Pro Se Crisis” Could Just Be a Diverse Group of People in
Court
As we explained in Part I, we are skeptical that there is
significant evidence of a pro se crisis in the federal courts today—or
at least not in the way many judges and commentators have
characterized it. However, our data and our methodology do not
produce evidence that there are more or less pro se litigants now than,
say, in the 1980s or 1990s. Our data do suggest, however, that pro se
litigants resist categorization as a distinctive socioeconomic group,
with a couple noted exceptions.165 Indeed, pro se litigants in federal
court may be more representative than we previously thought
because they appear to live in neighborhoods similar to those of the
rest of the American people.
What does it mean for judges and lawyers to know that pro se
litigants come from a representative sample of American
neighborhoods? First, the federal judiciary should not see these
litigants as a problem of strange outliers to manage, but as a public
worth serving.166 They are, on the whole, not population outliers but
rather representative of the public at large. Second, this data could
help educate judges and lawyers about the economic reality of most
Americans.167 More than one in four Americans, 92.4 million people,
are poor or near poor.168 In other words, our data suggests that pro
se litigants come from representative neighborhoods across the
United States, and the bench and bar need to remember that in a
country where the median household income is $68,703, those
representative neighborhoods are full of people of modest means.169
When faced with an opposing party who is unrepresented, a
lawyer might be tempted to make similar assumptions about the
merits of that litigant’s case. The legal profession is whiter,
165. Cf. Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
649, 670–71 (2010) (noting that the systems in place to assist lower-income
litigants to effectively litigate do not fully provide access to the courts).
166. Alas, we believe that unrepresentative outliers are also worth serving,
but perhaps it is easier to persuade busy judges to allocate strapped resources to
the general public.
167. See Hammond, supra note 44, at 1523–25 (developing a similar
argument in the context of in forma pauperis decisions).
168. See Distribution of the Total Population by Federal Poverty Level (Above
and Below 200% FPL), KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/stateindicator/population-up-to-200-fpl/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22
colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Jan. 15,
2021). Below 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Level is defined as an annual
income of less than $51,852 for a family of four. United States Demographics of
Low-Income Children, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILD. IN POVERTY, https://www.nccp.org/
demographic/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
169. Jessica Semega et al., Income and Poverty in the United States: 2019,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.census.gov/library/
publications/2020/demo/p60-270.html.
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wealthier, and more male than the rest of the United States
population.170 That positionality is exacerbated when lawyers are
squaring off against an unrepresented adversary. Our findings could
mitigate this sense of difference among lawyers. Pro se litigants
appear to come from representative neighborhoods in many of the
places where the lawyer practices, even if they might not be the
lawyer’s own neighbor. Moreover, our data suggests that pro se
standards, forms, and guidance can and should be tethered to
common expectations of the population.171 Resources could be used
in a more targeted manner, identifying neighborhoods with less
access to attorney networks.
One striking finding from this Article is that federal pro se
litigants do not live in poorer neighborhoods than the general public.
As discussed above, it is possible that some self-represented litigants
are poorer than their neighbors, but the data in the aggregate
suggests that that is unlikely across the federal system.172 To be sure,
some would-be litigants who cannot afford legal services at market
rates will find representation through various efforts, including
through legal aid organizations that receive government funding and
private donations, attorneys taking cases pro bono, and law school
clinics.173

170. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Gender Bias as the Norm in the Legal
Profession: It’s Still a [White] Man’s Game, 62 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 25, 31 (2020);
Deborah L. Rhode, Law is the Least Diverse Profession in the Nation. And
Lawyers Aren’t Doing Enough to Change That, WASH. POST (May 27, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/27/law-is-theleast-diverse-profession-in-the-nation-and-lawyers-arent-doing-enough-tochange-that/; Noam Scheiber & John Eligon, Elite Law Firm’s All-White Partner
Class Stirs Debate on Diversity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/27/us/paul-weiss-partner-diversity-lawfirm.html; see also Melissa Mortazavi, The Cost of Avoidance: Pluralism,
Neutrality, and the Foundations of Modern Legal Ethics, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
151, 151 (2014) (discussing the drafters of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility’s approach to handling the large number of minorities and women
entering the legal profession). See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, AM. BAR ASS’N
COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PRO., THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (2001) (reviewing the status of women in the American legal
profession).
171. See Amy Salyzyn et al., What Makes Court Forms Complex? Studying
Empirical Support for a Functional Literacy Approach, 15 J.L. & EQUAL. 31, 32–
33 (2019) (examining court-form complexity for pro se litigants). But see
Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 18, at 131 (arguing that “[t]he socioeconomic
needs that flow from inequality and push parties into civil courts cannot be
simplified away within the judicial branch”).
172. See McPherson et al, supra note 89, at 426.
173. See Civil Legal Aid 101, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/olp/
civil-legal-aid-101 (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
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However, research suggests that these resources are not
sufficient to address the unmet legal need in the United States.174
The federal government, though a significant source of funding, has
contributed less and less to legal assistance programs over the last
forty years.175 The Legal Services Corporation, the agency created by
Congress to disperse grants to legal aid groups, calculates that for 86
percent of the civil legal problems reported by low-income Americans
in 2017, those people received inadequate or no legal help.176 As for
volunteer attorneys, one study calculated that it takes fifty-nine pro
bono attorneys to equal the year’s work of a single legal aid
attorney.177 Similarly, law school clinics, although an increasingly
powerful part of the public-interest landscape in the United States,
are still a patchwork of various programs, restricted to working on
certain issues in certain ways.178
The dearth of “low bono” attorneys may be part of the
explanation. Low bono refers to legal services for those clients who
are not poor enough to be eligible for legal aid but are still too poor to
secure an attorney at market rates.179 Those would-be litigants can
choose either not to enter the court or to do so pro se. In other words,
perhaps legal services are unaffordable to a larger swath of
Americans than we previously thought. Regardless, at least in the
federal system, there are not so much justice deserts as there are
isolated pockets—pro se litigants living amidst and among

174. One of us has written elsewhere why we should be skeptical that this
mix of legal aid organizations, pro bono attorneys, and law school clinics can
adequately meet the needs of low-income Americans. Andrew Hammond,
Poverty Lawyering in the States, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND
POVERTY 215, 223–24 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO
BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE 12 (2005) (describing how lawyers
historically provided minimal pro bono service and little financial support for
legal aid organizations); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race,
Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 339, 352 (2008).
175. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES: HOW CONGRESS
LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY HALF A LAWYER 18, 21 (2000).
176. The Justice Gap, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (June 2017), https://www.lsc.gov/
media-center/publications/2017-justice-gap-report.
177. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style
Civil Legal Assistance, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79, 97 (2007); see also AM. BAR ASS’N
STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO & PUB. SERV., SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS 3, 6, 45 (Apr. 2018) (surveying over
forty-seven thousand attorneys in twenty-four states and estimating that in
2016, American attorneys provided an average of 36.9 hours of pro bono services
each).
178. Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a
Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law
School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1918 (1999).
179. Luz E. Herrera, Rethinking Private Attorney Involvement Through a
“Low Bono” Lens, 43 LOY. L. REV. 1, 39–40 (2009).
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represented litigants.180 Our data suggests that many, if not most,
federal pro se litigants live in urban areas. That suggests that
physical distance from potential representation may not explain why
people are litigating on their own in federal court.
One challenge here is the inscrutability of the nonclaimant in a
private enforcement system. If individuals choose to bring civil
lawsuits, then we have to account for when they choose to and when
they refuse to do so. Other scholars have speculated as to why people
choose not to bring claims.181 But this inscrutability invites various
alternative hypotheses about the types of claims brought in federal
civil litigation. Perhaps metropolitan areas, with their dense
networks of government actors, corporations, and civil society groups,
create an environment in which more individuals are aware of their
rights under federal law.182 Or conversely, metropolitan areas,
despite the concentrated presence of attorneys, relative to more rural
areas, still do not have a sufficient supply of attorneys who can or will
represent litigants who need alternative fee arrangements.183
Then again, perhaps a litigant’s pro se status does not signal
their inability to pay for a lawyer, but rather, the weakness of their
claim. Because of fee-shifting statutes that govern many types of
federal question claims, attorneys who choose to represent litigants
in these cases can secure reasonable fees and costs—as long as they
win.184 This method of financing litigation encourages lawyers to
screen clients and cases, lest they take on too many cases with little
likelihood of success.185 More research is needed, particularly on the
prevalence of the plaintiffs’ bar in different legal markets in the
United States, especially when it comes to the types of cases brought

180. See Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101
IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1288–89 (2016) (noting motivations for individual citizens in
areas with otherwise sufficient geographical access to legal representation to
avoid using the civil legal system to resolve problems).
181. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 642–43
(1980); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 534–35 (1980);
Rebecca L. Sandefur & James Teufel, Assessing America’s Access to Civil Justice
Crisis, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 753, 768 (2021); see also DAVID M. ENGLE, THE MYTH
OF THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY: WHY WE DON’T SUE 1–2 (2016).
182. See Erin York Cornwell et al., Networking in the Shadow of the Law:
Informal Access to Legal Expertise Through Personal Network Ties, 51 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 635, 646–47 (2017).
183. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 12, at 144–45. See generally JOHN HEINZ
ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 43 (2005).
184. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the
Civil Justice System, JUDICATURE, July–Aug. 1997, at 22, 22–23 (1997).
185. See, e.g., id.
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in federal court.186 Only then will we have a better understanding of
why there seems to be a mismatch between unrepresented litigants
and cities that have a relative surplus of lawyers.
B.

Reconceptualizing the Justice Gap for Communities of Color

Perhaps the most striking difference between neighborhoods that
produce more-than-expected pro se litigants and neighborhoods with
fewer pro se litigants is that the former are more likely to be
communities of color. It appears that individuals from predominantly
White neighborhoods who file cases in federal court are more likely to
be able to secure counsel. That is not as common if these individuals
live in more racially diverse neighborhoods. This finding has
significant implications for how we conceptualize access to justice
initiatives, legal networks, and civil litigation more broadly.
First, this finding of racial difference suggests that if the federal
judiciary, local bar groups, and nonprofits want to address the most
urgent needs of pro se litigants, they should focus on serving
neighborhoods that are not homogeneously White.187 Were a
particular federal district court to establish a formal partnership with
a law school clinic or legal aid organization, the chief judge or court
staff overseeing that effort should inquire as to whether and how that
organization serves neighborhoods and communities that are not
homogeneously White, and perhaps ask that clinic or organization for
evidence of some kind of track record for community engagement.
Second, the American bar should take concrete steps to rise above its
troubling history as a profession that shut out women and people of
color.188 A profession that is not representative of the public it serves
will struggle to serve the public. Third, we should keep in mind that
a civil legal system is not simply a set of formal rules and institutions,
but one that is inextricably linked to the peculiarities and pathologies
of the society in which it operates.
The empirical research of Professor Victor Quintanilla and others
is particularly relevant here.
Professor Quintanilla has
186. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for
Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 1002–03 (2000)
(discussing how a monopoly on the legal system affects access).
187. Brian Libgober, Getting a Lawyer While Black: A Field Experiment, 24
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 53, 56–57 (2020); Mary Nell Trautner, How Social
Hierarchies Within the Personal Injury Bar Affect Case Screening Decisions, 51
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 215, 219 (2006).
188. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (upholding Illinois’ decision
to deny women the right to practice law); Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 593
(Md. 1936) (holding that the University of Maryland’s law school could no longer
exclude Black students); see also KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE:
THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 38–60 (2012) (describing the
experience of Black lawyers during Jim Crow); Melissa Mortazavi, Incivility as
Identity, 2020 MICH. ST. L. REV. 939, 939 (2020); Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and
the Profession: The No-Problem Problem, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1001, 1005 (2002).
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demonstrated the extent to which judges, lawyers, and law students
are unsurprisingly susceptible to bias.189 Linking our findings with
that line of research, proceduralists should continue to explore the
extent to which attorneys evaluate the strength of a claim based on
the race of the claimant. That might explain why, in this Article, we
see more pro se litigants come from communities of color than we
would otherwise expect. This hypothesis is consistent with research
on the racial bias of other professional groups. For example, the
persistently high and inequitable rates of Black maternal mortality
raise concerns that physicians and other medical professional
discount Black women’s symptoms and pain.190 Employers have also
been found to discriminate against Black and Latino job applicants
with equivalent resumes to White applicants,191 as well as those who
come from neighborhoods associated with many formerly
incarcerated persons.192 All in all, pro se litigants present ample
additional opportunities to study the many ways biases undermine
our civil justice system.
C.

Pro Se Litigants in Rural Communities

Our findings also call for renewed focus on rural access to justice.
The work of Professors Lisa Pruitt, Hannah Haksgaard, and others is
instructive here.193 Importantly, Pruitt, Haksgaard, and others
demonstrate that, despite common perceptions of rural America,
many of these communities are racially and ethnically diverse, such
as the predominance of Latinos in the Central Valley of California,
Black Americans throughout the rural South, and American Indian
tribes across the country.194
These scholars and others have surveyed the particular
challenges of meeting legal needs in rural America, including

189. See Quintanilla et al., supra note 37, at 1091; see also Kroeper et al.,
supra note 37, at 198; Victor D. Quintanilla, Doing Unrepresented Status: The
Social Construction and Production of Pro Se Persons, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 543,
547–55 (2020) (summarizing this research).
190. Bani Saluja & Zenobia Bryant, How Implicit Bias Contributes to Racial
Disparities in Maternal Morbidity and Mortality in the United States, 30 J.
WOMEN’S HEALTH 270, 27–71 (2021).
191. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. et al., Racial Disparities in Job Finding and Offered
Wages, 56. J.L. & ECON. 633, 637–38 (2013).
192. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOCIO. 937,
937–38 (2003) (describing the difficulty formerly incarcerated people have with
trying to gain employment).
193. See generally, e.g., Pruitt et al., supra note 149, at 72–74; Lisa R. Pruitt
& Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of
Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219 (2010) (analyzing the different types of
indigent criminal defense across Arizona); Hannah Haksgaard, Rural Practice as
Public Interest Work, 71 ME. L. REV. 209 (2018).
194. Pruitt et al., supra note 149, at 118–19.
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disproportionately high rural poverty rates,195 lagging legal aid
funding,196 the challenges of creating economies of scale for legal
services,197 the attrition of lawyers in rural areas and the particular
ethics issues, including conflicts of interest, that result when many
rural lawyers are engaged in a mixed practice of civil and criminal
cases.198 Furthermore, the state-based surveys conducted by these
scholars suggest that many lawyers practicing in these communities
are retiring, and not enough new lawyers are replacing them.199
Legal deserts in rural America are thus likely to get worse—and
soon.200
Taken as a whole, this scholarship points to a lack of lawyers as
a defining feature of rural America. These academic findings echo
professional surveys of legal representation in rural areas.201
However, this literature would lead us to expect more pro se litigation
in these areas, and yet in our mapping of pro se litigation, we found
less.202 We think this discrepancy between our findings and what
previous scholarship might suggest is worthy of further inquiry.
As with our findings of the disproportionately high number of pro
se litigants coming from communities of color, our findings of the
disproportionately low number of pro se litigants in rural
communities demands more research. Perhaps there is a yetunexplored relationship between the presence of lawyers in a
community and rights-claiming by laypersons. In other words,
perhaps living in a community with few lawyers might make people
less likely to think that they can access the courts, including on their
195. See id. at 117.
196. Id. at 116.
197. Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 193, at 227–28.
198. Haksgaard, supra note 193, at 216–17; Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 193,
at 294–98.
199. Pruitt et al., supra note 149, at 121.
200. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA PROFILE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2 (2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/news/2020/07/pot
lp2020.pdf (finding that “40% of all counties and county-equivalents in the
United States–1,272 of 3,141–have less than one lawyer per 1,000 residents”).
201. Catherine Albiston et al., Public Interest Law Organizations and the
Two-Tier System of Access to Justice in the United States, 42 L AW & SOC. INQUIRY
990, 992 (2017) (demonstrating that public interest legal organizations “are
geographically distributed in ways that disadvantage rural and poor
communities”); Lorelei Laird, In Rural America, There Are Job Opportunities and
a Need for Lawyers, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/too_many_lawyers_not_here._in_rural_america_lawyers_are_f
ew_and_far_between; AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO & PUB. SERV.,
RURAL PRO BONO DELIVERY: A GUIDE TO PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICES IN RURAL
AREAS 7 (2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
probono_public_service/as/aba_rural_book.pdf (“Staff-based rural legal aid
programs face similar difficulties because they cover a wider geographic region
with fewer personnel than urban legal aid programs.”).
202. See supra Figure 2 and accompanying text.
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own. Or perhaps it is not the lack of lawyers that explains the
prevalence of pro se litigation in federal court, but physical proximity
to a federal court. Potentially, the physical distance to federal courts
could impact the ability of rural Americans to litigate in them. It
would be worth exploring, then, whether what we observe in federal
courts here is also true of state courts. However, since many
unrepresented litigants in state courts are defendants, it seems
unlikely that would-be plaintiffs in rural areas are consistently
choosing to file cases in state courts instead of federal courts.203
Future research could also explore party identification and pro se
litigation. As the two major political parties in America have become
more polarized, they have also become more geographically
distinct.204 Finally, we could also explore to what extent rural
residents have fewer claims than urban residents, whether because
of fewer torts or less actionable discrimination.
D.

Courts as Democratic Infrastructure

To conclude our discussion of implications of our research, let’s
step back for a moment. It is an unsettling time in the United States.
At the time of this writing, nearly one million Americans have died
from COVID-19, more than in World War II, the Korean War, and the
Vietnam War combined.205 At the start of the pandemic and in just a
few months, over twenty million Americans lost their jobs.206 In the
wake of the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Americans
demonstrated in over two thousand cities in the United States and
sustained some of the most significant protests against racism and
white supremacy in decades.207 And after one of the most divisive
203. See Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Assembly-Line Plaintiffs, 135 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1) (on file with authors) (documenting how
most civil cases in state courts are contract disputes in which a business that is
usually represented by counsel brings a lawsuit against a consumer who is
usually unrepresented).
204. See LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR
IDENTITY 3 (2018); MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS
BECAME DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS 2–3 (2009).
205. Mortality Analyses, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED. CORONAVIRUS RES.
CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality (last visited Jan. 13, 2022);
Heather Hollingsworth & Tammy Webber, US Tops 500,000 Virus Deaths,
Matching the Toll of 3 Wars, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 22, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/us-over-500k-coronavirus-deaths-4ffa86c709f6a843d
e9cf0711e7215cf.
206. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46554, UNEMPLOYMENT RATES DURING THE COVID19 PANDEMIC 1 (2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46554.pdf; Effects of COVID19 Pandemic on the Employment Situation, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-theemployment-situation-news-release.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
207. Audra D.S. Burch et al., How Black Lives Matter Reached Every Corner
of America, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
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elections in American history, an insurrection stormed the Capitol to
prevent a joint session of Congress from certifying the winner of the
presidency.208
It would be naive for any of us to ignore the swirl of recent events
buffeting and reshaping our society. But it is equally important to
contextualize them in a broader and longer trend of the unyielding
and pervasive feature of American society today: inequality. The
pandemic, the racial divisions, and the political acrimony have been
fed by an increased sense among millions of Americans that their
lives and livelihoods are threatened, precarious, and disposable.
After fifty years of stagnation, American wages have only begun to
budge.209 Union membership is half of what it was nearly forty years
ago.210 Student debt has doubled in the last decade, to the tune of
$1.7 trillion.211 These economic realities compound racial ones,
leaving the typical Black family with a tenth of the wealth of a
comparable White family.212 How courts respond to this unyielding
and pervasive feature of American society today is worthy of more
attention than a single article, but one can sketch at least three
hypotheses, none of them mutually exclusive, on the relationship
between civil litigation and inequality.
The first perspective views the courts as insulated from
inequality, or at least more so than other legal and political
institutions. This “courts apart” thesis points to the fact that federal
judges—as salaried civil servants with life tenure—can ignore the
2020/06/13/us/george-floyd-protests-cities-photos.html (detailing the locations of
protests from May 26, 2020, to June 9, 2020).
208. Kat Lonsdorf et al., A Timeline of How the Jan. 6 Attack Unfolded—
Including Who Said What and When, NPR (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.npr.org/
2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attack-unfolded-includingwho-said-what-and-when.
209. Cf. JAY SHAMBAUGH ET AL., HAMILTON PROJECT, THIRTEEN FACTS ABOUT
WAGE GROWTH i (2017) https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/thirteen_
facts_wage_growth.pdf (describing how “[t]he U.S. economy has experienced
long-term real wage stagnation and a persistent lack of economic progress for
many workers”); Drew Desilver, For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely
Budged in Decades, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-fordecades/ (noting that even though nominal wages may have increased, the
purchasing power remains the same as it was forty years ago).
210. Union Members Summary, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (noting that 10.8 percent of
American workers were members of unions compared to 20.1 percent in 1983,
the first year for which comparable data is available).
211. Student Loans Owned and Securitized, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLOAS (last visited Jan. 14, 2022).
212. Kriston McIntosh et al., Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/02/27/
examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/ (comparing the net worth of the average
white family ($171,000) to that of the average Black family ($17,150)).
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winds and whims of contemporary politics and society. Judges need
not worry about corporate influence or cross-class acrimony because
they are shielded from political and economic forces. Short of
impeachment, judges answer to no one. They need only uphold the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, as interpreted by
themselves and the other members of the judiciary. However, some
in the judiciary itself have suggested that the salaries of judges are
insufficient to insulate them from our increasingly unequal society.
Chief Justice Roberts claimed that low judicial pay amounts to a
“constitutional crisis.”213 Paying federal judges upwards of $210,000
a year is only a crisis if either you believe that judges need to be in
the top 1 percent of earners, as opposed to the top 2 percent as they
are now, or that the best judicial prospects in America are mostly or
more likely to be practicing at large, corporate law firms.214
The second is “the courts against” perspective, which claims that
courts may be more open to claims of marginalized groups than
majoritarian institutions like state legislatures and Congress. The
federal courts, in particular, were indispensable fora for civil rights
claims in the second half of the twentieth century.215 Whether or not
the faith in litigation was strategic or misplaced does not diminish
the sheer number of lawsuits to define and enforce fundamental
rights to education, work, and voting.216 It is not inconceivable to
think that the courts again could be the first branch of the federal
government to see novel, creative theories, buttressed by social
movements, push back against the ills of inequality. Indeed, courts
could be more accessible to these claims than other government
213. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
1 (2007), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport
.pdf.
214. In 2019, a federal district court judge’s salary was $210,900, a federal
circuit judge’s salary was $223,700, and a Supreme Court Justice’s salary was
$258,900—Chief Justice Roberts earned $270,700. Judicial Compensation, U.S.
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation (last
visited Jan. 14, 2022); see also Albert Yoon, Love’s Labor’s Lost? Judicial Tenure
Among Federal Court Judges: 1945–2000, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2003);
Andrew Van Dam, What Percent Are You?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2016),
https://graphics.wsj.com/what-percent/. Still, Chief Justice Roberts was right to
suggest in a previous year’s report that if judicial compensation is not competitive
in the profession, the judiciary could “come to be staffed by a combination of the
independently wealthy and those following a career path before becoming a judge
different from the practicing bar at large.” JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2005 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2006), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/year-end/2005year-endreport.pdf.
215. See David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical
Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
65, 141 (1981).
216. See id. (noting a high number of civil rights cases, even in the mid-1900s);
Gough & Poppe, supra note 11, at 574–75 (noting that the number of pro se cases
has been both steady and high).
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bodies, in part, because litigants do not need legislative majorities or
significant political influence to file a case. These features of the
federal courts could allow them to hear cases by those who seek to
push back against these forces of inequality.
The third is “the courts along” perspective, which treats the
federal judiciary as one in a set of institutions that preserve privilege
and influence for the political and economic elite of the country. This
view tends to label the federal courts as pro-business.217 This
perceived cozying up to corporate America is enhanced by the sense
that the Supreme Court, far and away the most politically salient and
visible court in the country, has handed down decisions widely seen
as favoring corporations and the wealthy.218 Indeed, there are
parallels to how many derided the federal courts from the 1880s to
the 1930s.219
In the most widely adopted procedural system among common
law countries, it is best to admit that federal judges render decisions
and behave in ways that support each of these three views. The
challenge for civil procedure is that how federal judges relate and
respond to these forces of inequality will shape how they think of the
cases before them. This initial reaction will be especially true in pro
se litigation, where judges lack the benefit of adversarial briefing.
The challenge for us scholars is to pursue lines of inquiry that inform
which procedural rules and practices should change—and how—in
light of this epoch-making inequality. We suggest that scholars need
to focus on the people using the courts—all the people, not just those
who have the benefit of counsel—if we are to make sense of the
current state of civil litigation in the United States.

217. See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1449 (2013) (finding the Roberts Court to be the most probusiness court between 1946 and 2011); Lee Epstein et al., When It Comes to
Business, the Right and Left Sides of the Court Agree, 54 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
33, 33 (2017) (showing this pro-business trend includes increasingly unanimous
and lopsided rulings for business litigants).
218. The fact that many of these decisions were considered to be clarifying
procedural rather than substantive law may get lost in the political rhetoric
around the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011) (describing the key issue in the
case as an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (noting that the pivotal issue in the case
was pleading standards, as dictated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
219. See REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 69–71 (2006); EDWARD
A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 15 (2000); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND
INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–
1958, at 244–46 (1992).
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CONCLUSION
We hope that this Article opens up new lines of inquiry for our
field and the rest of legal academia. For proceduralists, our findings
suggest we should further explore and interrogate the ways lawyers
and paralegals act as gatekeepers for would-be plaintiffs in the
federal system and the particular circumstances of litigants in rural
areas. This Article also should spur more research on the geographic
distribution of unrepresented litigants in other systems in American
civil litigation, like state, tribal, and territorial courts.
We also believe our findings can inform how these same
scholars—and perhaps more importantly, how judges and lawyers—
conceptualize various access-to-justice initiatives, including how
courts should structure resources for these litigants, like forms,
handbooks, and help desks.
Beyond the particular context of federal civil litigation, critical
cartographies can help map legal landscapes in other fields and
provide generative insights and foundations to challenge the received
wisdom in legal academia.
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